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Sustainable Finance & China’s Green
Credit Reforms: A Test Case for Bank
Monitoring of Environmental Risk
Virginia Harper Ho†
In the past few years, the focus of international organizations on sus-
tainable finance— the integration of environmental, social, and governance
(“ESG”) considerations into global financial systems— has intensified
because of its potential to promote financial stability, better risk assess-
ment, and more efficient allocation of capital.  The success of these efforts
depends in part on whether banks and other financial institutions can
manage, price, and monitor environmental risk.
This Article offers new answers to this question from China— one of
the most important global test sites for sustainable finance.  Corporate gov-
ernance theory suggests that creditor monitoring can promote managerial
accountability and lower agency costs, a role that is critical in economies
like China, Europe, and much of the developing world, where companies
depend heavily on bank financing.  China’s recent green credit reforms
offer an opportunity to re-examine these theories and assess banks’ poten-
tial to drive sustainable finance across global capital markets.
To examine banks’ monitoring potential, this Article uses data for
2012– 2017 from the annual reports and sustainability reports of the
twenty-one Chinese banks that are at the forefront of China’s green finance
initiatives, as well as insights from fieldwork conducted in 2016 and 2017.
This investigation shows that leading Chinese banks are strengthening
their ability to integrate environmental criteria into credit risk assessment
in response to regulatory priorities but that barriers to efficient pricing
and monitoring of environmental credit risk remain.  This Article identifies
key lessons from the Chinese context for sustainable finance reform
elsewhere.
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Alford, Intisar Rabb, Matthew Erie, Andrea Boyack, Craig Martin, and participants at the
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Colloquium, and the 2017 Green Finance Conference hosted by the Shanghai University
of Finance & Economics.  For able research assistance I am indebted to Yuyang Lin and
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Introduction
International organizations from the United Nations’ Environmental
Programme (UNEP) and the World Bank1 to the Organisation for Eco-
1. In January 2014, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) began its
initiative to facilitate and promote sustainable finance policies. UNITED NATIONS ENVI-
RONMENT PROGRAMME & THE WORLD BANK GROUP, ROADMAP FOR A SUSTAINABLE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM 2 (2017), http://unepinquiry.org/publication/roadmap-for-a-sustainable-finan-
cial-system/ [https://perma.cc/E36Q-5UUS] (presenting an annual review of sustaina-
ble finance policy instruments and their implementation) [hereinafter UNEP & WORLD
BANK].
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nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD)2  and the G203  are now
working to promote sustainable finance— the integration of environmental,
social, and governance (“ESG”) considerations into global financial sys-
tems in order to promote financial stability, asset pricing, risk assessment,
and more efficient allocation of capital toward investments that promote
sustainable and resource-efficient development.4  The success of these poli-
cies depends in no small part on whether financial institutions can manage
and price environmental and social sources of financial risk and how well
corporations’ access to capital can be linked to their environmental
performance.
This Article offers new answers to these questions from China— one of
the most important global test sites for sustainable finance.  For over a dec-
ade, China has been building policy frameworks for sustainable finance
that incentivize environmental sustainability, “green development,” and its
transition toward a “green economy.”5  Since 2015, the Chinese govern-
ment has introduced next-generation green finance policies that require
financial institutions and capital markets to play an even bigger role in
funding China’s green development agenda.6  China also initiated strategic
initiatives on green finance in 2016 as part of its presidency of the G20 and
2. The OECD has numerous finance initiatives related to sustainable development.
See Financing for Sustainable Development, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-
sustainable-development/ [https://perma.cc/H2XR-7GF8].
3. See, e.g., G20 GREEN FINANCE STUDY GROUP, G20 GREEN FINANCE SYNTHESIS
REPORT 2017 (2017), http://www.unepinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/
2017_GFSG_Synthesis_Report_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/CSQ7-V9QF] (presenting the
findings of the G20 Green Finance Study Group).  In 2017, the Task Force on Climate-
Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) of the G20’s Financial Stability Board produced its
final report on the financial effects of climate risk and its framework for disclosure of
climate-related risk by financial institutions and other corporations. See generally TCFD,
Publications, G20 FIN. STABILITY BOARD (June 29, 2017), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/publi-
cations/ [https://perma.cc/4NMB-CVDJ] (identifying links between climate risk, finan-
cial performance, and systemic risk).
4. This definition draws on several leading formulations: UNEP INQUIRY, THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM WE NEED: ALIGNING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM WITH SUSTAINABLE DEVELOP-
MENT 13 (2015), http://unepinquiry.org/publication/inquiry-global-report-the-financial-
system-we-need/ [https://perma.cc/A3E6-RYTF]; Sustainable Finance, EUR. COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/sustainable-
finance_en [https://perma.cc/D6K2-TGJV] (defining sustainable finance as “the provi-
sion of finance to investments taking into account environmental, social[,] and govern-
ance considerations”); UNEP & WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 9, 83– 84 (surveying
definitions adopted by the United Nations, the European Union, and governments in
Switzerland and Indonesia).
5. See infra Part II (explaining the evolution of China’s sustainable finance
policies).
6. GUIDING OPINIONS ON ESTABLISHING THE GREEN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
( ) (promulgated by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC),
China Ministry of Fin. (MOF), Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n (NDRC), China Ministry of
Envtl. Prot. (MEP), China Banking Reg. Comm’n (CBRC), China Sec. Reg. Comm’n
(CSRC), and China Ins. Reg. Comm’n (CIRC), Aug. 31, 2016, effective Aug. 31, 2016;
GREEN FINANCE TASK FORCE, ESTABLISHING CHINA’S GREEN FINANCIAL SYSTEM: REPORT OF
THE GREEN FINANCE TASK FORCE 3– 4 (2015), http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/commu-
nications/EstablishingChinasGreenFinancialSystem.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E84-
GA7N].
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continues to promote green finance innovation.7
By 2017, twenty-one leading Chinese banks had issued over USD 1.3
trillion (RMB 8.3 trillion) in green credit, accounting for nearly 10% of all
corporate loans.8 One such project involved a fund formed by a Chinese
bank, Huaxia Bank, in cooperation with a syndicate of three international
organizations that was used to build a photovoltaic power plant.9  Another
project, financed by one of China’s leading green credit lenders, the China
Industrial Bank Co. Ltd. (CIB), involved a RMB 100 million loan to help a
company acquire energy efficient rental vehicles.10  As in these cases, green
credit funds can support green technology and renewable energy innova-
tion,11 but green credit also includes measures to reduce capital flows to
uses that harm the environment.12  In recent years, central government pol-
icies have pushed banks to extend less financing to highly polluting sectors
or to industries designated as experiencing serious overcapacity.13
According to official estimates, green credit financing extended in the first
half of 2017 will save 715 million tons of water and 215 million tons of
7. G20 GREEN FINANCE STUDY GROUP, supra note 3, at 3.
8. CBRC, STATISTICS ON GREEN CREDIT OF 21 MAJOR BANKS (21
) (2017), http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/files/2018/
8E392703618F4CB283AACB07A391FBDE.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QLZ-JCH3] [herein-
after CBRC STATISTICS]; CBRC, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 63– 64 (2017), http://
www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/files/2018/529E627CE8324461BD37CE152929E9BE.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2QNR-AP5P] [hereinafter CBRC 2016 REPORT] (reporting a 2016
year-end green credit loan volume of RMB 7.51 trillion); UNEP & INT’L INST. GREEN
FINANCE, CENT. U. FIN. & ECON., ESTABLISHING CHINA’S GREEN FINANCIAL SYSTEM: PROGRESS
REPORT 2017 17 (2017), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/
22285/China_Green_Finance_ProgressRep_ES_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=Y
[https://perma.cc/W8JY-MURR] [hereinafter UNEP & IIGF].  This is a marked increase
from the mid-2000s. See Bing Zhang et al., Tracking the Implementation of Green Credit
Policy in China: Top-Down Perspective and Bottom-Up Reform, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1321,
1322 (2011) (citing CBRC data from 2008 reporting green credit volume of RMB 10.6
billion for the top five commercial banks in 2007, which amounts to less than 1% of the
total loan volume for that year, RMB 2.6 trillion).
9. CBRC, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 77 (2016), http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/files/
2018/AF549A3E49BA45548422CDD9D54DE11E.pdf [https://perma.cc/87QZ-E3MB]
[hereinafter CBRC 2015 REPORT].
10. Jiang Xueqing, Banking Sector Takes Greener Approach, CHINADAILY ASIA (June
30, 2016), https://www.chinadailyasia.com/business/2016-06/30/content_154562
66.html [https://perma.cc/82DA-UWYK].
11. CBRC, NOTES ON THE GREEN CREDIT STATISTICS INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
( ) 1, http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/files/2018/DD114DB
E72084577BBB4392A38E65FFE.pdf [https://perma.cc/BW7M-28G6] [hereinafter
CBRC NOTES] (summarizing standards set under China’s Green Credit Statistics System
(GCSS)). See, e.g., SHANGHAI PUDONG DEVELOPMENT BANK, 2014 CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 109– 11 (2014) (reporting on credit volumes supporting renewa-
ble energy, green construction, and resource conservation projects, among others).
12. See infra Part II (discussing mandatory restrictions on financing to heavily pol-
luting or overcapacity sectors).
13. CBRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 9, at 75 (reporting on the level of lending to
highly polluting firms, those with high resource consumption, and those in sectors with
overcapacity known collectively as the “two high, one overcapacity” ( ) firms);
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, EXPLORING GREEN FINANCE INCENTIVES IN CHINA: FINAL REPORT
4 (2013), https://www.pwccn.com/en/migration/pdf/green-finance-incentives-oct2013-
eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8ZL-8K2X].
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coal, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by nearly 500 million tons.14
This Article focuses on green credit, a core pillar of China’s recent
green finance reforms, in order to explore the role banks may play in moni-
toring environmental risk and implementing sustainable finance policies
more broadly.  As the above examples show, green credit is debt financing
provided by a bank or bank syndicate to firms or projects that offer envi-
ronmental benefits.15  It works by relying on lenders to limit polluting
firms’ access to credit and to direct capital to projects that promote envi-
ronmental conservation, sustainability, and remediation.16  China’s green
credit reforms, therefore, offer a unique opportunity to consider the poten-
tial for bank monitoring to drive better environmental risk management by
corporate borrowers.
Corporate governance theories developed largely in Western contexts
suggest that creditor monitoring plays an important role in driving mana-
gerial accountability and lowering agency costs,17 and the mechanisms of
creditor monitoring are well-known.18  Banks and other private lenders rely
on a range of contractual tools to constrain management, including loan
covenants that constrain the borrower’s ability to take on new debt or to
make investments that increase its credit risk.  Lenders have access to infor-
mation on the borrower’s financial condition and its compliance with the
financial and technical covenants throughout the life of the loan.19  Credi-
tors also enjoy strong contractual enforcement rights, such as the ability to
seize collateral or to accelerate the debt in the event of default.20  Lenders
issuing green credit can use these same contractual tools to monitor
14. CBRC STATISTICS, supra note 8 (reporting aggregate savings from green credit
issued in the first half of 2017).  According to China’s GCSS, instituted in 2013, banks
should calculate the environmental benefits of green loans using third-party verifica-
tions, feasibility studies, and related data on an annualized basis. CBRC NOTES, supra
note 11, at 3.  The CBRC provides formulas and calculation tools banks may use for
projects where this information is not already provided to the lender. Id.
15. The terms “green” or “sustainable” finance often include other nonfinancial
dimensions of financial risk and return, including labor and employment (i.e. social)
aspects of corporate operations. See, e.g., CBRC, NOTICE OF THE CHINA BANKING REGULA-
TORY COMMISSION ON ISSUING GREEN CREDIT GUIDELINES (
) (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/EngdocView.do?docID=3CE646
AB629B46B9B533B1D8D9FF8C4A [https://perma.cc/RMT9-VEJH] (China) [hereinaf-
ter GREEN CREDIT GUIDELINES] (addressing both social and environmental risk).
16. See infra Section I.C (describing these mechanisms).
17. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 344– 45 (1976) (highlight-
ing the effect of capital structure on agency costs). See also Frederick Tung, Leverage in
the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57
UCLA L. REV. 115, 144– 48 (2009) (discussing private lenders’ role in reducing agency
costs). See generally Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Miss-
ing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006) (same).
18. See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corpo-
rate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1081– 90 (1995) (discussing these mechanisms);
Tung, supra note 17, at 135– 39 (same).  See generally Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 17
(same).
19. Tung, supra note 17, at 131– 39; Triantis & Daniels, supra note 18, at 1082– 84; R
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 17, at 1232. R
20. Tung, supra note 17, at 131– 35. See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 18, at 1093.
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aspects of the borrower’s credit risk that are tied to environmental impacts
and risk management.21  As discussed below,22 Chinese commercial banks
use similar strategies and are also subject to regulations and governance
standards modelled on international best practices.
This Article examines the extent to which China’s top banks serve as
external monitors of corporate environmental credit risk.23  Its analysis
relies primarily on data from 2012 to 2017 drawn from the annual reports
and sustainability reports of the 21 leading Chinese banks that account for
China’s officially reported green credit volume.24  Because information on
how banks manage and price credit risk is generally not publicly reported,
this study explores key aspects of bank green credit implementation
through interviews conducted in 2016 and 2017 in Beijing, Hong Kong,
and Shanghai.25  As detailed in Appendix E, these interviews were con-
ducted with bank managers and employees at a sample of the banks
included in this study, as well as with central-level regulators, lawyers,
accountants, consultants, academics, and other professionals engaged in
implementing or shaping various aspects of China’s green credit policies.26
Although these sources do not permit quantitative analysis of the extent of
creditor monitoring or its ultimate effect on borrowers’ environmental risk
management, they do shed light on many aspects of financial institutions’
ability to monitor environmental credit risk and their incentives to do so,
expanding the limited literature on international bank practice in Western
jurisdictions.27
These findings also contribute to the emerging literature on sustaina-
ble finance policies.  Over sixty governments worldwide have adopted
green credit policies to varying degrees, including the United Kingdom,
Brazil, Canada, Australia, India, and Brazil.28  Although the European
21. See infra Section I.C (discussing environmental credit risk management).
22. See infra Section II.A (discussing China’s banking reforms).
23. Leading studies that predate the most recent reforms include Motoko Aizawa &
Chaofei Yang, Green Credit, Green Stimulus, Green Revolution? China’s Mobilization of
Banks for Environmental Cleanup, 19 J. ENV’T. & DEV. 119 (2010) and Zhang et al., supra
note 8. See generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERs, supra note 13 (surveying implementa- R
tion of pre-2013 policies).  The UNEP-FI works with Chinese policymakers and advisors
and regularly assesses China’s green finance strategy. See generally UNEP & IIGF, supra
note 8 (identifying implementation successes and challenges). R
24. Much of the analysis focuses on the eighteen commercial banks in this sample,
since China’s three policy banks provide funding based on more explicit policy goals.
25. Except where indicated on Appendix E, interviews were conducted on condition
of anonymity with respect to both the individual’s identity and their employer’s.
26. The methodology of this study is discussed in more detail infra Section III.A.
27. These studies include: Olaf Weber, Environmental Credit Risk Management in
Banks and Financial Service Institutions, 21 BUS. STRAT. & ENVT. 248 (2012) (examining
practices at the six Canadian commercial banks); Olaf Weber et al., Incorporating Sus-
tainability Criteria into Credit Risk Management, 19 BUS. STRAT. & ENV’T. 39 (2010); Paul
Thompson, Bank Lending and the Environment: Policies and Opportunities, 16 INT’L. J.
BANK MARKETING 243 (1998) (examining environmental policies at twelve banks from
eight jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom).
28. According to the 2017 annual report of the UNEP-FI, over 300 policy and regula-
tory measures to promote sustainable finance have now been adopted in over sixty coun-
tries. UNEP, UN ENVIRONMENT INQUIRY ANNUAL OVERVIEW 2017 5 (2018), http://
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Union and other governments are now considering broader programs,29
most national green finance policies focus on specific types of projects,
such as large-scale infrastructure projects or conservation efforts, or on cer-
tain types of risks, such as climate change.30  China is the first to adopt a
comprehensive green finance strategy, and its green credit policies are the
first to apply broadly to all commercial lending.31  China’s experience,
therefore, offers useful lessons for regulators and private sector initiatives
in other jurisdictions that are considering new directions for sustainable
finance reforms.
This Article begins by explaining the basic tools of creditor monitoring
and how a client or project’s environmental risk can affect credit risk.  Part
II provides a brief introduction to banking reform in China and the evolu-
tion of China’s green credit reforms.  Part III presents an analysis of current
green credit practice among Chinese commercial banks, and, to a lesser
extent, China’s policy banks.  This analysis shows that leading Chinese
banks are strengthening their ability to integrate environmental criteria
into credit risk assessment in response to regulatory priorities but that bar-
riers to efficient pricing and monitoring of environmental credit risk
remain.  The Article concludes by identifying areas for future research and
key lessons that can be drawn from China’s experience for sustainable
finance reform elsewhere.
I. Creditor Monitoring & Environmental Risk
Current efforts to promote sustainable finance rest on a two-fold pre-
mise.  The first is that the cost of corporate financing does not yet reflect
the environmental and social risks of corporate operations.  The second is
that financial systems should integrate environmental and social factors,
either because of their financial impact on firms or investors, or because of
the need to align financial markets with sustainable development policy
goals.  For reasons discussed below, these assumptions are gaining wide-
spread acceptance among financial regulators in many jurisdictions.  But
sustainable finance will only work if financial institutions can (i) accu-
rately distinguish “green” and “non-green” investments; (ii) differentiate
among investments in each of these categories based on their relative level
unepinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/UN_Environment_Inquiry_Annual_
Overview_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9HQ-B7Y2].  Brazil’s central bank, for example,
has required all banks to establish environmental and social risk management systems.
UNEP & WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 55 (surveying national policies adopted by cen- R
tral banks and bank regulators). See also PBOC ET AL., ESTABLISHING CHINA’S GREEN
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 9 (2015) (referencing green credit programs by Canadian and Austra-
lian banks for low-emission auto finance); Aizawa & Yang, supra note 23, at 120 (citing
studies on green credit in Brazil and India).
29. See, e.g., EUR. COMM’N, supra note 4, at 6– 9, 13; UNEP & WORLD BANK, supra R
note 1, at 54 (observing a “major increase in system-level” sustainable finance measures R
since 2016).
30. See supra note 28 and sources cited therein. R
31. See infra Section II.C (discussing the scope of the CBRC’s 2012 Green Credit
Guidelines and related measures).
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of environmental and social risk; (iii) make financing decisions and price
risk accordingly; and (iv) make sure that funds earmarked for “green” (or
“more green”) uses are not diverted to projects that have a different envi-
ronmental and social risk profile.
Even though sustainability issues are relatively new considerations for
financial institutions, banks and other lenders are well-positioned to make
these kinds of determinations.32  Banks are also the dominant source of
corporate finance not only in China, but also in Europe and much of the
developing world.33  Even in the United States, where a focus on sharehold-
ers overshadows creditors’ role in corporate governance,34 banks are an
important source of capital and wield real influence over corporations.35
This Part explains how creditor risk assessment and monitoring work, why
ESG factors may be material to bank lenders, and how lenders can use the
standard mechanisms of creditor monitoring to monitor environmental
and social risk.
A. The Rationale for Creditor Monitoring
The literature on the governance effects of debt financing emphasizes
the important role of creditors as a check on firm management that can
reduce agency costs.36  Creditor monitoring complements other external
managerial constraints from, for example, product markets, managerial
labor markets, and the market for corporate control, as well as internal
corporate governance constraints from board oversight, corporate officer
fiduciary duties, and shareholder voting rights.37
32. The role of banks is central in many multilateral sustainable finance initiatives,
such as the “Sustainable Banking Network,” whose members include bank regulators in
twenty countries, including developing countries in Africa and Asia. UNEP, GREEN
FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: NEEDS, CONCERNS AND INNOVATIONS 29– 32 (2016),
http://unepinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Green_Finance_for_Developing_
Countries.pdf [https://perma.cc/26DM-GBHG].
33. Martin E`iha´k et al., Benchmarking Financial Systems Around the World 22– 23
(The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 6175, 2012) (noting that develop-
ing economies rely heavily on bank financing even when stock markets develop to sup-
ply alternatives).  European Financial Stability and Integration Review 2017, at 23– 26,
SWD (2017) 171 final (May 19, 2017) (reporting that bank lending has historically been
the major source of corporate finance for companies in Europe and is increasing post-
financial crisis). See also Thomas Schmid, Control Considerations, Creditor Monitoring,
and the Capital Structure of Family Firms, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 257, 258, 262 (2013)
(discussing bank-centric financing in Germany).
34. The mainstreaming of ESG-related shareholder activism has been a focus of my
own prior work. See Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for
Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 658– 62 (2016). See also Johanna M.
Shepherd et al., What Else Matters for Corporate Governance? The Case of Bank Monitor-
ing, 88 B.U. L. REV. 991, 993 (2008) (noting a “yawning gap” in the corporate govern-
ance literature regarding creditor governance).
35. See Shepherd et al., supra note 34, at 992 (noting the “pervasiveness of bank debt
among public companies”). See also supra note 18 and sources cited therein.
36. See generally Tung, supra note 17 (describing lenders as a routine influence on
management decision making in the U.S.); Triantis & Daniels, supra note 18 (describing
an interactive corporate governance model that reduces managerial slack).
37. Triantis & Daniels, supra note 18, at 1075– 77.
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Banks and other private lenders protect their claims on corporate
assets through a range of mechanisms that facilitate monitoring of the bor-
rower and reduce risk. These include financial covenants that limit the
borrower’s ability to take on new debt, and investment covenants designed
to prevent the borrower from substituting risky investments for more
secure ones or from transferring assets out of the firm.38  Secured lenders
have particular incentives to monitor risk that may reduce the value of their
collateral.  Most important for present purposes, debt agreements also give
banks the right to receive information on the borrower’s financial position
and its compliance with other covenants.  These information rights give
lenders a means of identifying financial difficulties and renegotiating or
enforcing the terms of the debt contract, and the disclosure obligations
may themselves lower agency costs and discourage management from tak-
ing actions that may be excessively risky to the lender.39  Banks also typi-
cally enjoy contractual rights to vote on mergers and other fundamental
changes and the right to intervene and exercise remedies in the event of a
breach.40
These contractual tools are quite flexible and, in fact, give banks real
power in the governance of the firm over time.41  Importantly, banks can
adjust the level of monitoring they employ if the borrower breaches some of
the technical covenants of the loan agreement, and they can “ratchet up”
the level of control they exert over a borrower as the risk of financial
default rises.42  In some cases, banks reserve the right to intervene directly
when the borrower encounters financial difficulties, for example, by forc-
ing changes in top management.43  Breach of these covenants may entitle
lenders to exercise standard remedies, such as placing new limits on future
borrowing, but more typically, breach gives the lender an opportunity to
renegotiate the terms of the debt contract.44
Multiple creditors of the same debtor may agree to delegate monitoring
responsibility to the creditor who can do so most efficiently.45  Unsecured
creditors, for example, may prefer to free-ride and let secured creditors or
guarantors bear the cost of monitoring.46  Triantis and Daniels observe
38. Id. at 1078.  Tung, supra note 17, at 135– 38.
39. Triantis & Daniels, supra note 18, at 1093 (describing loan covenants as “trip
wires” that offer early alerts of the borrower’s condition).
40. See id. at 1082– 89 (describing how banks exercise “voice” or “exit” strategies).
See also Tung, supra note 17, at 135– 39 (describing these tools).
41. See generally Tung, supra note 17.
42. See id. at 135– 38.
43. Id. at 156– 58.
44. Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51
REV. FIN. STUD. 393, 394– 95 (1984) (discussing the function of technical loan cove-
nants). See also Tung, supra note 17, at 141– 44 (discussing the “certainty of renegoti-
ation” as a key lever of bank influence).
45. Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to
Monitor, 1 J. FIN. 1113, 1113 (1985).  The focus here is primarily on creditor monitoring
by commercial lenders, as banks have a number of advantages over trustees and dis-
persed investors in publicly traded bonds. See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 18, at
1089– 90.
46. See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 18, at 1094.
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that other creditors often rely on banks as designated monitors because
banks often have stronger incentives to monitor the borrower and can do so
more efficiently.47  One reason is that banks often have a direct client rela-
tionship with the borrower that gives them access to information about the
borrower’s cash management at lower relative cost, allowing them to iden-
tify red flags earlier than other creditors.48  If a bank identifies problems, it
can send distress signals to other corporate stakeholders and to the market
indirectly by refusing to extend new debt or to renew existing debt, or by
exercising enforcement rights.49  By serving as delegated monitors, banks
can lower monitoring costs for shareholders and other stakeholders of the
firm and can improve firm value.50  At the same time, lenders’ ability and
incentives to monitor are reduced if they face higher competition from
other lenders or if they can transfer risk to other creditors, shareholders, or
to third parties through securitization, guarantees, insurance, or other
means.51
Ultimately, banks will set interest rates based on the borrower’s
creditworthiness and on the bank’s ability to manage or shift risk.  Borrow-
ers who hope to reduce the cost of debt capital may need to agree to more
burdensome covenants, greater transparency, and tighter lender monitor-
ing, and banks may use contractual pricing mechanisms that adjust inter-
est rates based on the borrower’s performance.52  Banks’ ability to charge
higher interest rates may motivate borrowers to reduce the risk of the
funded project or to secure a guarantor, insurer, or other third-party who
will bear part of the risk associated with the project or transaction.  The
power to price risk, therefore, gives banks direct and indirect influence over
the risk profile of the projects and borrowers they fund.
B. Understanding Environmental Credit Risk
Although banks have not traditionally incorporated environmental
and social risk into lending decisions or post-loan monitoring, evidence of
the potential materiality of these risks is increasingly motivating regulators
and financial institutions themselves to evaluate whether sustainability fac-
tors are material and should therefore be part of lenders’ standard risk
47. Id. at 1083– 88.  Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 17, at 1244 (noting that the lead
bank in a syndicate typically bears the primary monitoring responsibility). See also Dia-
mond, supra note 44 (developing a theory of delegated monitoring by banks and other
financial intermediaries).
48. See Tung, supra note 17, at 139.
49. See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 18, at 1084– 87 (discussing the signaling effect
of bank “voice” and “exit” from a lending arrangement).
50. See Rajan & Winton, supra note 45, at 1113; Triantis & Daniels, supra note 18,
at 1089– 90 (explaining delegated monitoring to banks as lower-cost monitors than bond
indenture trustees). See also Shepherd et al., supra note 34, at 1003– 06 (finding that
bank monitoring improves firm value).
51. See Tung, supra note 17, at 161– 69.
52. See id. at 147– 50, 152 (discussing performance-based pricing and the relation-
ship between interest rates and contract stringency).
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assessment.53  Prior studies have explained the ways in which environmen-
tal and social risk affects lenders’ financial risk in terms of direct, indirect,
and reputational impacts.54  Comparative studies on the extent to which
banks conduct environmental examinations of credit, loans, and mort-
gages find wide variation among jurisdictions, but note that banks in some
jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom and Canada, are beginning to
do so more systematically.55
First, environmental and social risks may be a source of direct liability
for lenders if they bear legal responsibility to clean up contamination
caused by an insolvent borrower.56 For example, in the United States,
lenders historically had a strong motivation to monitor borrowers engaged
in projects with high environmental impacts because of the prospect of
direct liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).57  In its present form,
CERCLA provides a safe harbor for lenders that discourages banks from
undertaking direct oversight of borrowers’ environmental practices.58
While it permits lenders to advise clients on risk mitigation and monitor-
ing, or to enforce the terms of credit or security agreements, lenders who
finance projects that produce environmental harm may still be held liable
if they engage in management functions.59  Potential legal liability, or pro-
tection from it, in other jurisdictions will obviously have equally important
impacts on lenders’ incentives to pre-screen or monitor corporate
borrowers.
More commonly, environmental risk associated with borrowers’ envi-
ronmental practices affects the market risk, credit risk, underwriting risk,
and business risk financial institutions bear.60  For example, a corporate
borrower’s efficiency in managing energy, water, and other natural
resources, and the extent to which its operations impair those resources
may translate into higher costs or reduced revenues; legal liability or
53. See supra notes 27– 30 and accompanying text. See also Thompson, supra note
27, at 247– 48 (concluding that banks in the United Kingdom believe that environmental
issues materially affect corporate lending); G20 GREEN FINANCE STUDY GROUP, supra note
3, at 12– 13.
54. See Thompson, supra note 27, at 244– 45.
55. See Weber, supra note 27, at 257– 59 (reporting that as of 2011, 53.5% of banks
from a global sample of sixty-one banks conducted environmental risk management as
part of the lending process, and that all six of Canada’s commercial banks do so).
56. See Thompson, supra note 27, at 244– 45.
57. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA), § 107(a)(2), provides for liability for any defendant who “directs the
workings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a [polluting] facility.”  CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2011); United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66 (1998) (inter-
preting the language in CERCLA § 107(a)(2) subjecting to liability any “person” who
“operated any facility at which . . . hazardous substances were disposed of”).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(E)– (F); CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 109-591, § 101(20)(E), (20)(F)
(2005).
59. Id. § 101(20)(E)(iii)– (iv) (defining “participate in management”).
60. See G20 GREEN FINANCE STUDY GROUP, supra note 3, at 8 (explaining these R
relationships).
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reputational harm can also impair its future profitability.61  In recent years,
a number of leading firms, including BP, have experienced credit down-
grades following high-profile environmental disasters, since serious envi-
ronmental penalties or cleanup costs increased their risk of default.62  Poor
management of environmental risk may also reduce borrowers’ profitabil-
ity, competitive advantage, and growth, and ultimately could impair the
value of assets that serve as collateral for the debt.63  All of these factors
may motivate banks to develop effective environmental credit risk manage-
ment systems to quantify, track, and price environmental risk.  Even when
the bank is not exposed to credit risk related to its customer’s activities, it
may still bear reputational risk if the public sees the bank as backing com-
panies that cause environmental harm, which, in turn, may hurt its ability
to attract clients.64
Empirical work among firms in the U.S. and Europe testing these
effects shows that better ESG risk management reduces credit risk— as
reflected by credit ratings— the likelihood of covenant breach, the price vol-
atility of public debt, bond yields, the rate of default, and spreads on credit
default swaps (CDS).65  Lending to firms with lower environmental risks
or better risk management practices may also reduce lenders’ transaction
costs by alleviating the need for lenders to engage in extensive negotiations,
demand more complex covenants, or undertake more extensive ongoing
monitoring.66  Some credit rating agencies are responding to this evidence
by integrating environmental and social indicators into their rating criteria,
in addition to standard corporate governance measures.67  Studies specifi-
cally testing the economic effects of bank monitoring also show that it
increases firm value.68
Government policies can also encourage banks to view environmental
and social risk as a material element of credit risk assessment.  Following
the Paris Climate Accords, many governments have begun tightening regu-
latory controls on high-polluting sectors, which increase corporate borrow-
ers’ liability risk and therefore the risk of default to their lenders.  The
G20’s 2017 recommendations on climate-related disclosure also call atten-
tion to the need for financial institutions to measure and disclose their
61. See Omer M. Elaskit & Andrew C. Worthington, Using Environmental and Social
Information in Lending Decisions, 5 INT’L. J. ECON. & FIN. 112, 113– 14 (2013) (citations
omitted).
62. See S&P GLOBAL RATINGS, RATINGS DIRECT: PROPOSAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL
AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) ASSESSMENTS 2 (2016).
63. See UNPRI, CORPORATE BONDS: SPOTLIGHT ON ESG RISKS fig. 1 (2013) (mapping
the relationship between ESG indicators, factors affecting creditworthiness, and credit
risk indicators).
64. See Thompson, supra note 27, at 245.
65. See, e.g., UNPRI, supra note 63, at 8– 10 (citing these studies).
66. See Elaskit & Worthington, supra note 61, at 113 (2013) (citations omitted).
67. See UNPRI, STATEMENT ON ESG IN CREDIT RATINGS (2016), https://www.unpri.
org/credit-ratings/statement-on-esg-in-credit-ratings/77.article [https://perma.cc/
WC56-Z3LX].
68. See generally Shepherd et al., supra note 34.
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exposure to climate-related risk more consistently.69  These pressures
could strengthen bank demand for better information on environmental
credit risk and borrower risk management practices.
Beyond risk management, preferential incentives and other public pol-
icies favoring green-tech, renewable energy, and the like may also
encourage banks to extend capital to “green” borrowers or to do so on pref-
erential terms.  Although these policies may not motivate environmental
risk monitoring, the prospect of new business opportunities is already driv-
ing some financial institutions to engage in green lending or to develop
financial products that are defined in terms of the positive environmental
outcomes they may produce.70  Innovating in these areas will require
banks to develop their capacity to measure and price environmental out-
comes, which may have spillover effects on other areas of their business.
Although banks’ incentives will not always align with environmental
risk monitoring, banks may nonetheless have stronger incentives than
shareholders or corporate boards to influence corporate practice.71  The
long-term nature of many environmental risks makes them more likely to
be financially material to banks than to equity investors who may have a
more short-term perspective.  In addition, traditional agency theory
predicts that shareholder pressure is likely to incentivize managerial risk-
taking,72 which may be more likely to push firms to externalize environ-
mental costs rather than manage environmental risk.
C. Environmental Credit Risk Management
As the prior discussion shows, the potential financial impact of envi-
ronmental risk, as well as the opportunities green finance offers, explains
why banks may incorporate environmental factors into lending decisions.
To do this, banks must first seek reliable information on the nature of envi-
ronmental risk and then attempt to manage that risk.  Alternatively, as dis-
cussed above, borrowers may need corporate guarantees, risk insurance, or
some other form of bonding to reduce their exposure, or they can structure
the investment in a way that transfers risk to a third party.  If they are
69. See TCFD, ANNEX: IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TCFD (June
2017), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/publications/final-implementing-tcfd-recommenda-
tions/ [https://perma.cc/Q8W7-4MTZ] (providing specific performance indicators for
the financial sector).  In 2011, the Global Reporting Initiative released its Sustainability
Reporting Guidelines for the Financial Sector to encourage ESG disclosure. See GLOBAL
REPORTING INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES & FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR
SUPPLEMENT (2011), https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G3-English-
Financial-Services-Sector-Supplement.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ4J-KL8F].
70. See generally UNEP-FI, GREEN FINANCIAL PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (2007) (survey-
ing green finance products developed by North American financial institutions).
71. See Tung, supra note 17, at 131, 133 (discussing the unique qualities of banks
that facilitate monitoring, as compared to corporate boards).  Although jurisdictions
vary, as a matter of corporate law in the United States, the mechanisms of shareholder
influence on corporate boards and management is indirect.  For an overview of these
mechanisms, see Harper Ho, supra note 34, at 658– 62.
72. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 17. R
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unable to transfer or eliminate credit risk, lenders can ultimately charge a
higher interest rate to compensate for the added risk exposure.
The United Nations’ Environmental Programme Finance Initiative
(UNEP-FI) has developed a framework for conceptualizing this environ-
mental credit risk management (ECRM) process.73  The UNEP-FI frame-
work has six stages: identification, analysis, categorization, mitigation,
monitoring, and in some circumstances, reporting.74  These stages span
the entire period from the start of the lender’s due diligence before the loan
is issued through the life of the loan, and potentially through to renegoti-
ation or enforcement of the bank’s rights under the terms of the debt.75
The core of credit risk management begins with pre-issuance due dili-
gence to identify credit risks that may derive from the environmental risks
and impacts of the project, in addition to analysis of the projects’ expected
cash flows or the borrower’s risk profile.  The International Finance Corpo-
ration (IFC) and multilateral development banks have developed due dili-
gence standards, procedures, and measures for assessing environmental
and social risk, and these institutions were among the first to use them in
connection with large-scale project finance investments.76  These standards
are now familiar to international financial institutions, since they informed
the development of the “Equator Principles,” which are voluntary commit-
ments now endorsed by most leading financial institutions globally.  The
Equator Principles commit signatories to conduct ongoing environmental
and social risk monitoring for certain project finance-related invest-
ments.77  As Part III discusses in the Chinese context, banks who are not
engaged in project finance or who have not adopted the Equator Principles
also widely reference the IFC standards, and the standards are the basis of
IFC initiatives to develop client banks’ capacity to evaluate environmental
risk.
Once banks obtain the necessary information, they apply internal pol-
icies, applicable regulations, and information from the client to assess and
categorize the risk associated with the borrower or the project.  Just as cred-
itors can condition financing on firms’ commitment to abide by contrac-
tual covenants, so, too, banks extending green credit can negotiate
covenants requiring ongoing environmental compliance, lender consent for
new investments, and reporting of specific ESG information periodically to
73. See generally UNEP-FI, UNEP FI GUIDE TO BANKING AND SUSTAINABILITY (2011),
https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/file/11476/download?token=A56RslOv [https://
perma.cc/VB4M-45DN] [hereinafter UNEP FI GUIDE, 1st ed.]. See also UNEP-FI, UNEP
FI GUIDE TO BANKING AND SUSTAINABILITY (2d ed., 2016), http://www.unepfi.org/
fileadmin/documents/guide_banking_statements.pdf [https://perma.cc/LW3V-PNBV].
74. See UNEP FI GUIDE, 1st ed., supra note 73, at 20– 22.
75. See id. at 19– 22.
76. For the core standards of the IFC, see INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION
[IFC], E&S PERFORMANCE STANDARDS i– 9 (2012), https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect
/115482804a0255db96fbffd1a5d13d27/PS_English_2012_Full-Document.pdf?MOD=
AJPERES [https://perma.cc/MFU4-7F9J] (outlining these standards).
77. See EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, The Equator Principles, http://equator-principles.com/
about/ [https://perma.cc/X5TQ-3XY5] (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (defining their
scope).
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the lender.  Lenders considering extending credit to projects with high
environmental credit risk can also require a borrower commitment to miti-
gate that risk during the life of the loan or to obtain insurance to limit the
lender’s exposure.  Standard loan covenants may also cover obligations to
monitor, mitigate, or disclose environmental impacts, requiring compli-
ance with applicable law.  Breach of these covenants then entitles lenders to
exercise standard remedies, and again, even if not directly enforced, cove-
nant breach can allow the lender to renegotiate the terms of the debt con-
tract and possibly demand further assurances or a higher interest rate.78
But banks’ ability and incentives to monitor environmental credit risk
are subject to many of the same limits as creditor monitoring of other risks.
Prior studies have found that banks’ credit risk evaluations primarily focus
on the initial credit assessment phase and that the costs of renegotiation
and enforcement may limit ongoing monitoring.79  Even with respect to
financial covenants, banks often focus on enforcing repayment obligations
rather than monitoring technical defaults of the loan covenants, and the
potential costs of enforcement may similarly dissuade lenders from actively
monitoring covenants addressing environmental credit risk.80 And again,
financing may be structured to shift the financial risk of noncompliance to
another creditor, even if the terms of the debt give the initial lender the
power to monitor environmental risk.81
Beyond these constraints, another widely recognized limit on bank
monitoring of environmental risk is lender access to reliable informa-
tion.82  The borrower itself may provide information on environmental risk
or compliance, but banks typically rely on public data from regulators,
such as environmental enforcement authorities, because of concerns about
the reliability of self-reported data.83  Direct environmental due diligence
can be more costly than traditional creditworthiness assessments because
of the diffuse nature of the information and the need to obtain outside
expertise if the bank lacks the capacity to assess environmental credit risk
internally.84  China’s recent reforms provide an opportunity to assess the
potential for lender monitoring in light of these challenges.
78. See also Tung, supra note 17, at 141– 44, 151– 52. See also supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
79. See Tung, supra note 17, at 133– 34, 144, 150– 51.
80. A report by the UNPRI observes that “defaults resulting purely from environ-
mental and social issues are virtually unheard of.”  UNPRI, supra note 62, at 10.
81. Tung, supra note 17, at 162– 67 (discussing risk transfer and credit derivatives).
82. See G20 GREEN FINANCE STUDY GROUP, supra note 3, at 14– 15 (noting the diffi- R
culty of using public environmental data for financial analysis).
83. See id. at 12.  To be sure, much of the information obtainable by regulators, such
as emissions data, is also based on self-reporting.
84. For example, data from regulatory agencies is often disaggregated by agency and
by indicators; environmental information is often reported on a facility rather than com-
pany-wide basis, making financial analysis difficult. See id. at 14– 15 (noting the high
search costs of obtaining public data and aggregating it for financial analysis). See also
Michael Viscuso, Note, Scrubbing the Books Green: A Temporal Evaluation of Corporate
Environmental Disclosure Requirements, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 890– 91 (2007) (noting
that this kind of data incompatibility has stymied inter-agency cooperation between the
EPA and the SEC).
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II. China’s Green Credit Reforms
Over the past decade, the Chinese government has introduced an
array of top-down mechanisms to more clearly define “green” investments,
to encourage the development of green financial products, and to create an
oversight framework for financial institutions in order to enforce the new
policies.  These reforms are aligned and driven by the central government’s
economic development goals, as reflected in China’s Twelfth (2011– 2015)
and Thirteenth (2016– 2020) Five-Year Plans, which promote green and
low-carbon development.85  China’s international commitments to address
climate change are also spurring on these initiatives.86  In contrast to ear-
lier periods, China’s central government is now looking to banks them-
selves rather than to state agencies to redirect capital to green investments
and reduce corporate environmental impacts.87
These policies impose tighter regulatory oversight of financial institu-
tions and specifically direct them to undertake environmental due dili-
gence and monitoring of their clients’ and prospective clients’
environmental risk.  China’s bank regulator, the China Banking and Insur-
ance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) (prior to 2018, the China Banking
Regulatory Commission (CBRC)), and China’s central bank, the People’s
Bank of China (PBOC), are the two primary regulators with authority to
establish green finance standards for financial institutions.  Until 2018,
China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) was
responsible for implementing national development policy and China’s
response to climate change.88  It adopted standards for energy efficiency
credit and for green bonds, and partnered with the CBRC, China’s Ministry
of Environmental Protection (MEP), and other agencies in issuing green
finance guidance.89  The MEP’s successor, the Ministry of Ecology and
Environment (MEE), assumed responsibility for China’s climate change
policies from the NDRC in 2018.90  Guidance and voluntary standards cre-
85. See generally COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, THE THIRTEENTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA: 2016– 2020
( ) (Compilation & Translation
Bureau, Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of China trans., 2016), http://
en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf [https://perma.cc
/CT64-YEGZ].
86. See generally NDRC, CHINA’S POLICIES AND ACTIONS FOR ADDRESSING CLIMATE
CHANGE (2017).
87. All of the banks in this study that report green credit loan volumes are also
required to quantify the environmental benefits associated with these loans. See CBRC
2015 REPORT, supra note 9, at 76 and accompanying text. R
88. Under reforms of administrative agencies under the State Council introduced in
2018, the NDRC’s climate response functions have been merged under the new Ministry
of Ecology and Environment, formerly the MEP.  Xu Lingui, Lyu Qiuping & Chen Yon-
grong, China Unveils Restructuring Plan, XINHUA (Mar. 13, 2018), http://
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/13/c_137036855.htm [https://perma.cc/FZB9-
5VB7].
89. See, e.g., CBRC & NDRC, NOTICE ON ISSUING THE ENERGY EFFICIENCY CREDIT
GUIDELINES ( ), No. 2, Jan. 13, 2015; NDRC, GUIDANCE ON
GREEN BOND ISSUANCE ( ), No. 3504, Dec. 31, 2015.
90. See Xu et al, supra note 88.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN302.txt unknown Seq: 17  8-FEB-19 14:43
2018 Sustainable Finance & Bank Monitoring 625
ated by international and domestic organizations— including the China
Banking Association, other trade associations, and NGOs— also influence
green credit standards and practice.91  The following discussion introduces
the context of Chinese bank reform and basic green credit policy
framework.
A. Banking Reform & Creditor Power
Until relatively recently, Chinese banks were not well-motivated to
undertake market-based credit risk assessments of their borrowers or to
engage in ongoing monitoring.  Chinese banks were entirely state-owned,
as were many of their clients.92  Because the state itself ultimately bore the
risk of default and would support banks that held bad debt, there was little
reason for banks to develop the ability to evaluate credit risk indepen-
dently.93  Historically, the state also imposed strict constraints on interest
rates, so banks had little ability to raise interest rates for riskier
borrowers.94
Over the past decade, however, the central government has initiated
sweeping reforms of bank regulation to enable Chinese banks to compete
globally, to expand access to capital domestically, and to transition banks
to a market-based model.  In the early 2000s, the Chinese government
began to encourage banks to attract foreign investment and to improve
their risk management and corporate governance by listing their shares.95
As Appendix A indicates, nearly all of the banks included in this study are
now publicly traded in mainland China and on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange, and retain international accounting firms as their auditors.  As a
result, they are now increasingly subject to external market pressure from
investors and stock exchange regulation.  As of 2016, banks listed in Hong
Kong must also publish ESG reports that include disclosures on their envi-
ronmental practices, and are encouraged to adopt international reporting
91. Corporate social responsibility guidelines for the banking sector have been intro-
duced by the CBRC and the China Banking Association. See CBRC, OPINION ON
STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BANKING SECTOR AND FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS ( ), No. 252, Dec. 5,
2017; CHINA BANKING ASS’N, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY GUIDANCE FOR FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS ( ), Jan. 12, 2009.  NGOs who moni-
tor the environmental impact of financial institutions include BankTrack and the World
Wildlife Federation.  See examples in Yunwen Bai, et al., The Role of China’s Banking
Sector in Providing Green Finance, 90 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 89, 125– 37 (2013).
92. See JAMES STENT, CHINA’S BANKING TRANSFORMATION: THE UNTOLD STORY 6– 10,
66– 93 (2017) (tracing the evolution of the Chinese banking sector).  China’s “Big Four”
state banks first listed as publicly traded companies between 2003 and 2008. Id. at 87.
93. See id. at 72– 73, 76– 78 (describing Chinese banks in the 1990s as bursars of the
state).
94. See YONG TAN, PERFORMANCE, RISK AND COMPETITION IN THE CHINESE BANKING
INDUSTRY 7– 36 (2014) (discussing this history). See also Yuyang Tan et al., Completing
China’s Interest Rate Liberalization, 24 CHINA & WORLD ECON. 1, 10– 11 (2016) (identify-
ing primary reforms between 2012 and 2015).
95. See  TAN, supra note 94, at 16– 17.
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standards for these disclosures.96
Since the mid-2000s, banks have also been required to establish inter-
nal controls, risk management functions, and other corporate governance
reforms, and to meet capital adequacy requirements.97  In addition, banks
must now regularly report to the CBIRC on their efforts to restructure non-
performing loans (NPLs), their implementation of these internal govern-
ance and risk management requirements, and other aspects of financial
performance.98  All of these requirements are modeled after international
standards.99
Other reforms in the mid-2000s modernized the legal framework of
commercial law in China, refining rules for secured lending and shoring
up creditor remedies.  Most notably, China’s Property Law100 and its
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law101 came into force in 2007, around the time
China’s earliest green finance policies took shape.  These key reforms put
in place new rules for secured lending, bankruptcy, and foreclosure that
were informed by international best practice, improving creditor protec-
tions and streamlining procedures for filing and enforcing liens, accessing
debtor credit records, and the like.102  With this foundation, the contrac-
96. See generally HONG KONG STOCK EXCH., Main Board Listing Rules, app. 27; GEM
Board Listing Rules, app. 20.
97. See Nicholas C. Howson, China’s Restructured Commercial Banks: Nomenklatura
Accountability Serving Corporate Governance Reform?, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL
MARKETS: CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL IMPACT 123, 123– 30 (Zhu Min et al., eds., 2009) (sur-
veying reforms in the early- to mid-2000s). See also infra Section II.B (describing these
requirements).
98. See, e.g., CBRC 2016 REPORT, supra note 8, at 138, 145 (reporting on bank trans- R
parency policies).
99. See STENT, supra note 92, at 20– 21, 125– 49 (explaining how Chinese banks
adopted their technical capacity and internal structures based on Western models and
with the assistance of international financial institutions and foreign investors). See also
IMF, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF OBSERVANCE OF BASEL CORE
PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT NO. 17/403 10– 11 (2017)
(assessing the state of risk management, accounting, and oversight of the Chinese bank-
ing sector against international standards as of 2017).
100. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO WUQUAN FA ( ) [PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, PROPERTY LAW ] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16,
2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) (incorporating provisions of China’s 1995 Security Law
governing secured lending).
101. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO QIYE POCHAN FA ( )
[PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAW] (promulgated by the Stand-
ing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007).
102. See IMF, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: DETAILED ASSESSMENT REPORT: BASEL CORE
PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION, NO. 12/78 8– 9 (2012) (providing an
overview of the legal and regulatory framework of the banking sector). See also IFC,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS ADVISORY PROJECT IN CHINA  (2012), https://www.ifc.org/wps/
wcm/connect/5a98b5804aebf045904cfa888d4159f8/Secured+Transactions+Pro-
ject+n+China+Notes.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/V4U6-4WHG] (discussing
the IFC’s contribution to these reforms).  For an overview of secured lending practices,
creditor remedies, and the availability of judicial enforcement under the PRC Property
Law, the PRC Bankruptcy Law, and related regulations, see Jack Wang & Stanley Zhou,
Lending & Secured Finance— China, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDES [ICLG],
THE ICLG TO LENDING & SECURED FINANCE 2018 (6th ed. 2018), https://iclg.com/prac-
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tual tools outlined above that empower creditors to monitor corporate bor-
rowers are available to Chinese banks.
None of these important reforms have substantially altered the state’s
controlling position or influence in the corporate governance of most Chi-
nese banks.  The state remains the controlling shareholder for all of
China’s “Big Five” banks— the Bank of China (BOC), the Construction
Bank of China (CBC), the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and the Bank of Communications
(BOC)— and is the largest shareholder of all but three of the top-tier joint-
stock commercial banks through the Ministry of Finance and its holding
company, Central Huijin Company.103  The Chinese Communist Party’s
internal appointment system governs key personnel appointments.104
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are also the core clients for China’s largest
banks,105 and the full extent of state support or distressed SOE borrowers
is not transparent.  The embedded institutional position of Chinese banks
and their largest clients reduces banks’ ability and incentives to monitor
and price risk even as it increases their responsiveness to state policy
priorities.
Another important part of the context for green finance reform is that
Chinese banks also find themselves in a climate of increased competition
and economic pressure, amid concerns about rising levels of NPLs and the
overall stability of the Chinese banking system.  In order to increase access
to capital, China has expanded the number of commercial banks and other
financial institutions, including, by authorizing the entry of foreign finan-
cial institutions and, since 2015, by establishing private banks.106  In
2013, China also took initial steps to liberalize interest rates, which, as
commentators observe, has pushed banks to “sharpen their ability to price
loans commensurate with risk.”107  With interest rate liberalization and
heightened competition, banks’ interest rate margins and other key mea-
sures of profitability have declined from 2013 levels.108  On balance,
tighter competition reduces banks’ ability to charge higher interest rates for
investments with higher environmental risk and their willingness to
tice-areas/lending-and-secured-finance-laws-and-regulations/china [https://perma.cc/
5Y8E-HVL6].
103. Minsheng Bank, PingAn Bank, and Zheshang Bank are the three exceptions.
STENT, supra note 92, at 156.  See also Curtis Milhaupt & Li-Wen Lin, We Are the
(National) Champions, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2013) (exploring the state’s pervasive influ-
ence within and beyond the state sector).
104. See generally Howson, supra note 97.
105. NICHOLAS R. LARDY, MARKETS OVER MAO: THE RISE OF PRIVATE BUSINESSES IN CHINA
103– 12 (2014) (citing evidence that as of 2012, state-sector credit accounted for about
half of all commercial lending and credit to the private sector at 30– 44%).
106. See CBRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 9, at 25– 26, 43– 44 (highlighting a private R
bank pilot program and related policies).
107. TAN, supra note 94, at 180– 81; STENT, supra note 92, at 57– 58, 233– 35 (discuss-
ing the impact of interest rate liberalization).  Interest rate liberalization was also
intended to increase bank liquidity and expand access to capital. See IMF, THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA: SELECTED ISSUES, COUNTRY REP., NO. 16/271 14 (2016).
108. KPMG, MAINLAND CHINA BANKING SURVEY 5– 6 (2017) (reporting a decline in aver-
age net interest margins for five commercial banks from 2.6% in 2012 to 2.1% in 2016).
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expend resources on due diligence and post-loan monitoring.109  Tougher
regulations and enforcement policies rolled out by the CBRC in 2017 sug-
gest that banks have responded to the competitive environment by taking
on more risk rather than less.110  In addition, poor corporate governance
practices, the proliferation of complex financial products, and greater
financial intermediation— all of which are practices targeted by the CBRC’s
2017 crackdown— also weaken banks’ ability to play a monitoring role.111
Evidence of how banks included in this study are implementing green
credit reform and responding to these pressures is discussed in Part III
below.
B. Green Finance 1.0
Although China’s green finance reforms have their roots in administra-
tive guidance issued in the 1990s,112 current initiatives trace most directly
to the mid-2000s, which saw the introduction of policies to promote a “har-
monious society” and to address the environmental impact of China’s
breakneck development.  Core policies which the State Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (SEPA)— predecessor to the MEE— introduced in 2006 and
2007, in cooperation with the CBRC and the PBOC, represent the first
phase of China’s green finance reforms.  During this period, a number of
Chinese commercial banks, including China Industrial Bank (CIB) and
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (SPDB), received financial backing
and technical assistance on green finance from the IFC and other interna-
tional financial institutions.113
In 2007, SEPA, the CBRC, and the PBOC jointly issued the first green
credit policies directed at improving the environmental oversight of
banks.114  The 2007 guidance on environmental protection and credit risk
directed banks to incorporate environmental due diligence into credit man-
agement to ensure projects’ compliance with environmental regulations
109. See Tung, supra note 17, at 161– 69 (discussing the effect of competition on
lender monitoring).
110. See Chen Yun et al., CBRC’s New Supervisory Storm Is Here— Implications for For-
eign Banks in China, CHINA LAW INSIGHT (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.chinalawinsight.
com/2017/04/articles/finance/cbrcs-new-supervisory-storm-is-here-implications-for-
foreign-banks-in-china/(detailing the goals of eight notices released in July 2017).
111. See id. (describing the targeted practices).
112. See Aizawa & Yang, supra note 23, at 126 (discussing the PBOC’s initial Notice on
Implementing Credit Policies and Enhancing Environmental Protection, issued in 1995).
This notice urged banks to “implement national environmental protection policy in
credit activities.”  Zhang et al., supra note 8, at 1321. R
113. See also infra Part III.B.6 (discussing international influence on green credit
implementation).
114. SEPA, CBRC & PBOC, OPINIONS ON IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
POLICIES AND RULES AND PREVENTING CREDIT RISKS (
), No. 108, July 12, 2007. See also Hu Mengze & Li Wei, A Comparative Study
on Environment Credit Risk Management of Commercial Banks in the Asia-Pacific Region,
24 BUS. STRAT. ENV’T. 159, 171 (2015) (noting that the measures require banks “to
adhere to the ‘one ticket veto’ principle for clients who fail to fulfil environmental
requirements or standards); Aizawa & Yang, supra note 23, at 125 (describing the pur-
pose of the measures).
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and industrial policies and to redirect financing away from polluting sec-
tors and toward those with better environmental performance.  They also
imposed responsibility on financial institutions for violations of the gui-
dance.115  In order to facilitate legal compliance review as contemplated by
the 2007 measures, the MEP established a database on companies’ envi-
ronmental violations and introduced a process for information sharing
between local environmental authorities and banks.116  And in 2008, the
Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges introduced guidance and, in the
case of Shanghai, requirements for environmental disclosure by listed
companies.117
One of the challenges in implementing green credit reforms is that
they were introduced at a time when the basic infrastructure for credit risk
assessment by financial institutions was still not fully formed.118  The
PBOC first established a credit reference center to serve as the source of
consumer and commercial credit reporting for Chinese companies and
individuals only in 2006.119  In 2007, the CBRC adopted standard require-
ments for the content of information disclosure in commercial banks’
annual financial reports, including disclosure on risk management policies
and procedures.120  Between 2006 and 2009, the CBRC also introduced
the first guidance for commercial banks on basic risk management.121
Together, these measures require the development of risk assessment and
risk management policies and procedures, internal controls and audit sys-
tems, external disclosure to the CBRC of major risk events, and CBRC over-
sight of financial institutions’ implementation and reporting.  They also
urge the integration of reputational risk— which could include risk related
to environmental impacts— into corporate governance and the bank’s com-
115. SEPA et al., supra note 114.
116. Mengze & Wei, supra note 114, at 171.  This system is still evolving. See id. at
167.
117. MEP & CSRC, GREEN SECURITIES POLICY (
), No. 24, Feb. 25, 2008. See generally Hua Wang &
David Bernell, Environmental Disclosure in China: An Examination of the Green Securities
Policy, 22 J. ENV’T. & DEV. 339 (2013) (reviewing these disclosure requirements and
assessing their effectiveness).
118. See STENT, supra note 92, at 93– 95 (discussing the author’s experience at Min-
sheng Bank and Everbright Bank in the mid-2000s).
119. See CREDIT REFERENCE CENTER, PBOC, “Overview,” http://www.pbccrc.org.cn/
crc/zxgk/index_list_list.shtml [https://perma.cc/CGW4-KEF3].
120. CBRC, MEASURES FOR THE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS
( ), No. 7, July 3, 2007.
121. See CBRC, GUIDELINES FOR THE COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT OF COMMERCIAL
BANKS ( ), No. 76, Oct. 25, 2006, art. 10, 29 (requiring the board
to establish risk management and audit committees under its supervision for compli-
ance management); CBRC, NOTICE OF THE CHINA BANKING REGULATORY COMMISSION ON
ISSUING THE GUIDELINES ON THE OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT OF COMMERCIAL BANKS
( ), No. 42, May 14, 2007; CBRC,
NOTICE OF THE CHINA BANKING REGULATORY COMMISSION ON ISSUING THE GUIDELINES ON
THE REPUTATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT OF COMMERCIAL BANKS (
), No. 82, Aug. 25, 2009.
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prehensive risk management system.122  The internal processes these rules
envision are an essential foundation for any effective credit risk manage-
ment system, but the fact that they are of a relatively recent vintage limits
the potential pace of environmental credit risk management and green
credit implementation.
A number of studies have already explored the implementation of this
first phase of China’s green credit reforms.  One study, published in 2011
by Zhang et al., looked at commercial banks’ self-reported incentives to
implement green credit policy.123  The study found that market incentives
mattered more than state directives— banks that saw green credit as an
opportunity to expand their customer base or improve their brand recogni-
tion or reputation embraced green credit more enthusiastically than banks
who simply responded to the new guidance.124  According to a report by
the IFC, which has advised many Chinese banks on implementation of the
2007 policies, the guidance did motivate banks to begin to develop envi-
ronmental and social risk management systems and “to integrate [these]
considerations into credit decision-making and management.”125  How-
ever, because the 2007 measures were issued as administrative guidance,
which has a relatively low degree of authority, many banks did not feel
compelled to implement them.126  The IFC report also notes that “[l]ack of
environmental information, incomplete supporting policies and laws,
unclear implementation standards for different industries, and local pro-
tectionism [were among] the major barriers in the promotion of green
credit policy” during this period.127
C. 2012 Green Credit Guidelines
The foundation of green credit bank practice at present is the Green
Credit Guidelines issued by the CBRC in 2012, which build on the earlier
green finance measures and are designed specifically to aid banks in allo-
cating capital toward firms and projects with better environmental and
social risk management.128  The Guidelines urge lending institutions to
promote green credit in order to improve resource efficiency and serve the
real economy.129  They also encourage financial institutions to adopt risk
122. See generally CBRC, REPUTATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT NOTICE ( )
), No. 82, Aug. 25, 2009.
123. See Zhang et al., supra note 8 (surveying 500 branches of 12 banks in Jiangsu R
Province).
124. See id. at 1324, 1326.
125. See IFC, IFC’S ROLE IN CHINA’S FINANCIAL SECTOR TRANSFORMATION 34 (2012).
Because of the IFC’s role as an investor or consultant to CIB, SPDB, and other Chinese
banks, the IFC’s Environmental and Social Standards, which underpin the Equator Prin-
ciples, have informed these banks’ development of the environmental and social risk
management systems required under the 2007 green credit policies. See id. at 33– 34.
126. See Zhang et al., supra note 8, at 1323, 1326. R
127. See id. at 1322 (identifying similar challenges). See also IFC, supra note 125, at
33– 34, and sources cited therein.
128. See GREEN CREDIT GUIDELINES, supra note 15, art. 19. R
129. Id. at pmbl. See also CBRC, GUIDING OPINIONS ON BANKING INDUSTRY SERVING THE
REAL ECONOMY (2013).
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management across all stages of the lending process and to comprehen-
sively “identify, measure, monitor and control environmental and social
risks.”130  The Guidelines were developed in consultation with the IFC and
with some of the banks who are considered leaders in green finance, devel-
oped the Guidelines, incorporating the experience they have accumulated
since the mid-2000s.131
An important contribution of the Guidelines is that they help to define
green credit more consistently.  Under the Guidelines, green credit is the
extension of credit by financial institutions to firms based on a
creditworthiness assessment that incorporates an evaluation of the envi-
ronmental and social risk associated with the borrower.132  Lenders may
also establish environmental and social criteria for the use of the loan pro-
ceeds.133  In contrast to definitions of environmental and social risk that
focus only on the financial risks to the firm and its shareholders,134 the
Guidelines define environmental (and social) risks in terms of the negative
impacts of bank clients and their affiliates on a range of stakeholders.135
The Guidelines urge financial institutions to adopt sound governance
and internal management, and to ensure that capital allocation is based on
environmental and social credit risk assessments.136  They also contem-
plate a monitoring role for financial institutions.  Under the Guidelines,
banks must take steps to identify clients “with major environmental and
social risks” and to establish separate credit approval guidelines “for
restricted industries under state regulation and industries with major envi-
ronmental and social risks.”137  Most critically, the Guidelines prohibit
issuing credit to clients that “fail to comply with the relevant regulations on
environmental and social performance.”138  Under the Guidelines, each
bank has the flexibility to set its own strategies, policies, and internal over-
sight standards, including its own environmental and social risk appraisal
130. See GREEN CREDIT GUIDELINES, supra note 15, art. 4. R
131. Interview with branch Chief Executive Officer, Bank C, in Hong Kong (July 4,
2016); interview with green finance consultant, IFC, in Beijing (July 2017).
132. The Guidelines apply to “banking financial institutions,” which includes “policy
banks, commercial banks, rural cooperative banks, and rural credit cooperatives.”
GREEN CREDIT GUIDELINES, supra note 15, art. 2. R
133. Id. art. 3– 4.
134. For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s 2010 gui-
dance on climate-related risk defines it only in terms of the potential financial impact on
the company.  Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-9106, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010).
135. GREEN CREDIT GUIDELINES, supra note 15, art. 4 (“[E]nvironmental and social R
risks . . . means the possible harm and relevant risks that may be caused to the environ-
ment and society in the construction, production, and business operations of [bank
clients] and the important affiliates of such clients ( ), including environmen-
tal and social issues relating to energy consumption, pollution, land, health, safety,
migrant relocation, ecological protection, and climate change.”).
136. Id. art. 19 (urging financial institutions to “regard a client’s management of envi-
ronmental and social risks as an important basis for determining the allocation of credit
funds”).
137. Id. art. 10– 11.  The CBRC provided additional guidance in its 2014 Audit Stan-
dards, discussed infra note 148 and accompanying text, which identifies these sectors.
138. GREEN CREDIT GUIDELINES, supra note 15, art. 17. R
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standards.139
The Guidelines contemplate that lenders will also incorporate environ-
mental and social analysis into post-loan monitoring and due diligence, at
least for projects that present a major environmental and social risk.140
Article 18 of the Guidelines explicitly directs banks to utilize contractual
covenants to “strengthen [clients’] environmental and social risk manage-
ment” and to require borrowers that present significant risks “to submit
environmental and social risk reports,” and to make representations and
warranties regarding their environmental and social risk management and
improvement.  Because financial institutions may lack the capacity to effec-
tively assess and monitor these risks, the Guidelines give banks the option
to outsource client environmental and social risk auditing to third par-
ties.141  At the same time, the Guidelines encourage banks to identify guar-
antors and other third parties who can share the environmental and social
risk associated with a project.142
Finally, the Guidelines empower banks to impose explicit remedies for
breach of environmental risk management and to require additional risk
mitigation measures for clients the banks identify as presenting “major
environmental and social risks.”143  They also encourage greater trans-
parency from lenders themselves regarding their own environmental and
social risk, their implementation of the Green Credit Guidelines,144  and
“the impact of credit granting involving major environmental and social
risks.”145  Although not formally required in the Guidelines, a Green
Credit Statistical System (GCSS) established in 2013146 and green credit
audit standards, discussed below, require all twenty-one banks in this
study to report annually to the CBIRC on their implementation of the
Guidelines and the level of green credit lending they provide.147
D. Green Finance 2.0
Between 2014 and 2016, financial regulators introduced a new sec-
ond-generation green finance framework that reinforced the 2012 Guide-
lines and signaled the central government’s strong policy support for green
credit.  These policies were spurred on by China’s Thirteenth Five-Year
Plan (2016– 2020)— which explicitly requires the establishment of a green
139. Id. art. 11.  Article 15 also permits financial institutions to define the scope of
their own due diligence and credit risk assessments and determine whether third-party
expertise is necessary to help evaluate environmental and social risk. Id. art. 15.
140. Id. art. 20.
141. Id. art. 14.
142. See id. art. 15.
143. Id. art. 10– 11 (requiring banks to “classify . . . environmental and social risks,”
use them as the basis for credit ratings, loan pricing, lending determinations, and risk
management, and to require high-risk clients to undertake risk mitigation measures).
144. See id. ch. V (on internal control management and information disclosure); id.
art. 25– 28 (on implementation).
145. Id. art. 24.
146. See supra note 12 and sources cited therein. R
147. CBRC 2016 REPORT, supra note 8, at 59; see also supra note 11 and sources cited R
therein including notes on the Green Credit Statistics System.
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financial system and includes proposals to develop a green bond market,
green credit policies, and green development funds.148
While the contours of the framework itself did not emerge until 2015
and 2016, an important foundational component with respect to green
credit appeared in 2014, when the then-CBRC introduced its 2014 Green
Credit Implementation Key Audit Standards to guide banks in applying the
2012 Green Credit Guidelines and to establish key performance indicators
for green credit.149  As departmental guidance, the regulatory authority of
the 2012 Guidelines, like earlier sustainable finance policies, is relatively
low— they are soft standards rather than clear mandates.  However, the
2014 Audit Standards allow the CBIRC to assess bank compliance with the
Guidelines and are expected to ground more formal evaluation of bank
implementation in the near future.150  The 2014 Audit Standards apply to
all CBIRC offices and to policy banks, state-owned commercial banks
(SOCBs), joint-stock commercial banks, and the Postal Savings Bank.  All
of these institutions must conduct annual self-audits and submit an annual
audit report to the CBIRC, indicating the degree to which they comply with
each of the standards.151
The Audit Standards are extremely detailed, with over eighty indica-
tors ranging from the role of the bank’s board of directors in setting green
credit targets and overseeing green credit implementation, to measures for
how well the bank assesses its client’s legal compliance and environmental
and social risk in the initial credit assessment and post-issuance.152  Other
indicators measure how well the bank monitors covenants in the loan
agreement pertaining to borrowers’ environmental and social risk manage-
ment, and rate the bank’s own transparency and self-audit practices.
Banks must indicate their level of compliance on a four-point scale.  Nine
additional quantitative indicators ask banks to report their total green
credit loan volume and what I refer to here as “black credit”— loans to firms
in nineteen sectors with either high pollution, high resource consumption,
or overcapacity (i.e. “two high, one overcapacity” sectors), such as petro-
chemicals, heavy industry, and certain processing facilities.153  Because
banks are expected to use contractual covenants as the basis of environ-
148. THIRTEENTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN, supra note 85, ch. 48 § 1.
149. CBRC, GREEN CREDIT IMPLEMENTATION KEY AUDIT STANDARDS
( ) No. 186, June 27, 2014 [hereinafter AUDIT STAN-
DARDS].  The Audit Standards cover sixty-three industry sectors. Id. at app. I.
150. Interview with senior official, CBRC, in Beijing (July 2017). See also Maggie
Zhang, “Green” Financing to be Included in Chinese Banks’ Performance Ratings, S. CHINA
MORN. POST, Apr. 8, 2017, at B3 (indicating plans to include green finance measures in
the PBOC’s macroprudential assessment framework).
151. Interview with senior official, CBRC, supra note 150.
152. See AUDIT STANDARDS, supra note 149, ch. 2– 6.
153. See id. at app. II– IV (providing a list of the nineteen sectors and their industry
code).  The list includes, for example, smelting, concrete production, leatherworks and
dyed goods, and wood product manufacturing.  Appendix II to the Audit Standards
includes a list of high-risk project categories that are subject to special rules, and Appen-
dix III includes a basic rating system for banks to use in assessing their level of satisfac-
tion with borrowers’ environmental and social risk management practices.
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mental credit risk assessments and responses, an appendix to the Audit
Standards includes a list of recommended terms that banks are
encouraged— though not required— to include in green credit loan agree-
ments or in separate risk management contracts with the borrower.154
These are reproduced in part in Appendix D to this Article.  The recom-
mended terms include various covenants on environmental and social risk
management and reporting, as well as provisions that define events of
default with regard to those covenants and spell out specific remedies.
Under the Audit Standards, banks must also disclose their green credit
policies and strategies, report the loan volume associated with borrowers
who have environmental or labor-related compliance breaches, and dis-
close environmental or social risk incidents if required under any other
regulations.155  Finally, the Audit Standards include optional indicators on
which the bank may report, including average carbon emissions and aver-
age electricity consumption per employee, gender diversity in management,
number of disabled employees, hours of green credit training, and level of
engagement with environmental NGOs and other stakeholders.156  Many
of the banks in this study already use these indicators in their 2015 and
later sustainability reports.
At the end of 2015, the PBOC, in cooperation with the UNEP-FI, rolled
out an initial broad template for green finance policy in a report titled
“Establishing China’s Green Financial System.”157  It expands on the green
finance programs introduced in 2007 to cover fourteen different initiatives:
green credit, green listing, carbon trading, and mandatory green insurance
programs, as well as plans to develop or expand green ratings, green indi-
ces, and mandatory environmental disclosures for listed firms and bond
issuers.  The report also considers the possibility of new incentives, such as
preferential interest rates and eligibility requirements for green credit, to be
administered through government finance departments, policy banks, and
commercial banks.158
The 2015 framework contemplates the possibility of introducing joint
and several liability of financial institutions for environmental pollution
and other harms caused by projects they fund, in addition to administra-
tive, civil, and even criminal penalties that may apply.159  The joint and
several liability model, which the PBOC patterned in part on the owner-
operator liability provisions under CERCLA, is bolstered by the 2015 revi-
sions to the Law on Commercial Banks, which tighten banks’ environmen-
tal due diligence requirements and require financial institutions to closely
monitor environmentally risky projects.160
154. Id. at app. V.
155. Id. art. 24.
156. Id. pt. 2, items 10– 17.
157. See generally PBOC ET AL., supra note 28.
158. Id. at 20– 21.
159. See id. at 34– 35.
160. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO SHANGYE YINHANG FA (
) [LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON COMMERCIAL BANKS] (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2015), art. 1. See PBOC ET AL.,
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Also in 2015, the NDRC issued “Energy Efficiency Credit Guidelines”
to encourage lending for energy efficient projects that establish risk control
requirements and are subject to environmental credit risk monitoring.161
The NDRC Guidelines aim to promote low-carbon development and reduce
energy consumption through credit financing.162  The Guidelines instruct
banks to directly monitor funded projects through regular audits of legal
compliance and environmental and social risk management of the borrow-
ers, the projects, and any related energy service providers.  The Guidelines
also expect financial institutions to conduct initial environmental due dili-
gence and appraisal of the “technical risks” and potential savings a project
will generate, and to retain third-party auditors for that purpose.163  Fur-
thermore, the Guidelines contemplate that banks will impose remedies for
breach, including requiring additional collateral or remedial action, sus-
pending or terminating the loan, or accelerating the debt.164  Banks have
issued only a limited amount of credit under the NDRC Guidelines to
date.165
The official roll-out of a definitive next-generation green finance
framework came in August 2016, when seven agencies jointly issued new
“Guiding Opinions for Establishing the Green Financial System,” sending a
unified message of backing for green finance policy.166  The framework
outlines central government plans to promote green credit and other ele-
ments of the PBOC’s 2015 template, including measures to expand the
green bond market, promote green development funds, and expand green
insurance.167  The purpose of these measures, like that of their predeces-
sors, is to stimulate China’s green development transition by directing capi-
tal toward green operations.
The 2016 Guiding Opinions are noteworthy for their policy focus on
supra note 28, at 34 (proposing amendments to the PRC Commercial Banking Law).
Under the proposed measures, plaintiffs would not have a private right of action, but
local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) or the MEE itself would have the right to
sue commercial banks for harming the environment.
161. See CBRC & NDRC, supra note 89, art. 1 (establishing eligibility standards for
energy efficient projects, related risk control requirements, and environmental credit
risk management).  By their terms, the EEC Guidelines apply to all banking institutions
approved by the CBRC that conduct “energy efficiency credit business.” Id. art. 2.
162. Id. art. 3– 4.  The Guidelines make clear that green credit financing for such
projects is typically collateralized and repaid from the cash flows generated by the
funded project, which may reflect the net cost savings realized from energy efficiency.
See id. art. 9 (requiring that funded projects generate such funds on a stable and contin-
uous basis).
163. Id. art. 8– 15 (describing project structure and risk management obligations).
164. Id. art. 12, 14.
165. Interview with senior official, NDRC (July 2017).
166. GUIDING OPINIONS OF THE PBOC, THE MOF, THE NDRC, AND OTHER DEPARTMENTS
ON ESTABLISHING A GREEN FINANCIAL SYSTEM (
) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Aug. 31, 2016) [hereinafter GREEN FINANCIAL SYSTEM GUIDING OPINIONS].
167. Id. art. 2, 19, 22.
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some of the key challenges to green finance.168  The first is the challenge of
effective cross-agency collaboration between environmental and financial
regulators at all levels.169  The 2016 Guiding Opinions also emphasize the
need to harness capital markets to serve the real economy,170 to facilitate
efficient market pricing of negative externalities, and to create trading mar-
kets to stimulate conservation of water and other natural resources.171  In
recognition of the technical challenges that have limited green credit
reforms to date, the 2016 Guiding Opinions acknowledge the weak compa-
rability of the information sources available to financial institutions and
reemphasize the need for quantitative environmental and social risk indica-
tors to incorporate into credit risk assessment.172  Some of these challenges
were also the focus of policy experiments in five pilot zones for green
finance that China’s State Council established in four provinces and in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in June 2017.173
Other basic mechanisms that are essential to environmental credit risk
assessment, such as environmental cost accounting systems and rating sys-
tems for green credit products, are still being developed.174  For example,
although banks may develop their own tools for assessing environmental
credit risk, green ratings could facilitate credit risk evaluations for issuers
and projects based on “the impact of environmental pollution, the impact
to the ecological system, and the sustainable utilization of natural
resources.”175  Green ratings could also be used to ground fiscal subsidies
or penalties to borrowers, bank interest rate discounts or adjustments to
credit and bond financing costs, and eligibility criteria for a range of regu-
latory incentives.176  Two Chinese credit rating agencies are working to
develop these tools,177 and both are signatories of the U.N. Principles for
168. Many of these limits have been highlighted in prior surveys by the PBOC and
various reports of the Green Finance Working Group.  They also emerge from the
sources consulted in this study. See infra Part III.
169. See GREEN FINANCIAL SYSTEM GUIDING OPINIONS, supra note 166, art. 19, 26
(emphasizing cross-departmental collaboration throughout, as well as the need for pub-
lic-private partnerships).
170. Id. at pmbl.
171. Id. art. 9, 26.
172. Id. art. 4, 9– 11, 32– 33.
173. See China to Set up Pilot Zones for Green Finance, Cut Red Tape for Industries,
XINHUA (June 14, 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/14/
c_136366005.htm [https://perma.cc/7ZPJ-3FCR].  The four provinces are Guangdong,
Guizhou, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang. See id.
174. See PBOC ET AL., ESTABLISHING CHINA’S GREEN FINANCIAL SYSTEM: DETAILED RECOM-
MENDATIONS 10: DEVELOP ENVIRONMENTAL COST ANALYSIS 2, 4 (2015), https://drive.
google.com/file/d/0B1GFkVHt5UUeSWZEZTMybk1zb1E/view (recommending devel-
opment of environmental cost accounting systems to facilitate comparability of report-
ing and disclosure).
175. PBOC ET AL., ESTABLISHING CHINA’S GREEN FINANCIAL SYSTEM: DETAILED RECOMMEN-
DATIONS 8: ESTABLISH A GREEN RATING SYSTEM 2 (2015), https://drive.google.com/file/d/
0B1GFkVHt5UUeMmlrajNxS3hyYlE/view (identifying sub-indicators).
176. Id. at 2, 4.  Green credit ratings could also be made available to NGOs and other
public stakeholders. Id. at 4.
177. Id. (designating Dagong Global Credit Rating Co. and China Cheng Xin Interna-
tional Rating Co (CCXI) as the first credit rating agencies to take the lead).
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Responsible Investment’s voluntary statement on ESG Credit Ratings.178
E. Green Bonds & Green Credit
Although a full discussion of publicly traded “green” debt instruments
is beyond the scope of this Article, a key part of China’s green finance
reforms— its emerging green bond market— is also directly impacting stan-
dards for green credit, as well as the Chinese banking system’s capacity for
green finance.  Green bonds are “any type of bond instruments where the
proceeds will be exclusively applied to finance or re-finance . . . projects
and activities that will promote progress on environmental[ ]
sustainab[ility].”179
Initially issued largely by international financial institutions, such as
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), as well as by sov-
ereign wealth funds, the volume of global green bonds is rapidly rising, and
China is now one of the world’s leaders in volume of green bonds
issued.180  Green bonds issued by Chinese financial institutions have met
high demand from investors.181  Seven of the banks in this study, including
the CIB, ICBC, and SPDB, have issued green bonds since 2015, when the
ABC issued the first RMB-denominated green bond on the London Stock
Exchange.182  Commercial banks, such as the BOC and ICBC, account for
most of China’s green bond volume, and the policy banks’ corporate bonds
and offerings make up the balance.183
Green bonds are an important emerging source of capital for corpo-
rate green credit lending.  Like most other corporate loans, banks currently
extend green credit primarily from deposited funds.184  However, bank
representatives, officials, and green bond certification providers inter-
viewed for this study expect that green bonds will become an increasingly
178. See UNPRI, Statement on ESG in Credit Ratings, https://www.unpri.org/credit-
ratings/statement-on-esg-in-credit-ratings/77.article [https://perma.cc/AM34-GZCS]
(last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
179. INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKET ASSOCIATION, GREEN BOND PRINCIPLES 2015— VOL-
UNTARY GUIDELINES FOR ISSUING GREEN BONDS 2 (2015), https://www.icmagroup.org/
assets/documents/Regulatory/Green-Bonds/GBP_2015_27-March.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F6A7-VP6E].  This definition is adopted in the International Capital Market
Association’s Green Bond Principles (2015), which are the leading international green
bond framework.  They establish voluntary project selection, management, and report-
ing guidelines for green bond markets.
180. CLIMATE BONDS INITIATIVE & CHINA CENT. DEP. CLEARING CO., CHINA GREEN BONDS
MARKET 2017 2, 4 (2018) [hereinafter CHINA GREEN BONDS] (indicating that China is
second only to the United States in all green bonds issued worldwide).
181. As early as January of 2016, the SPDB and the CIB had issued green bonds that
were oversubscribed. See KPMG, MAINLAND CHINA BANKING SURVEY 2016 59, https://
assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/cn/pdf/en/2016/09/mainland-china-banking-
survey-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFK5-JMUV].
182. CBRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 9, at 77.  The proceeds were required to be R
invested in green projects in accordance with the Green Bond Principle, and the offering
was oversubscribed. See id.
183. CHINA GREEN BONDS, supra note 180, at 5.
184. Interview with senior official, CBRC, supra note 150.
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prominent source of green credit funding.185
Of particular relevance to the argument here, green bonds not only
generate new sources of capital, but also introduce an additional monitor-
ing mechanism, since qualification as a “green bond” means that the pro-
ceeds must be applied to designated “green” uses.186  Although not
formally required under current guidelines for Chinese green bond issuers,
China’s stock exchanges and over-the-counter debt markets all require as a
matter of practice that green bond issuers obtain third-party certification
pre-issuance that the bond proceeds will qualify as “green.”187
In 2015, the PBOC and the NDRC introduced separate rules for green
bond issuance that define green bonds and provide a process for tracking
how bond proceeds are used.188  The NDRC approves green bond offerings
by state-sector firms and large private companies, and the PBOC autho-
rizes green bond offerings by financial institutions.  In addition to encour-
aging government agencies to promote green bond issuance and
investment, the rules of both the NDRC and the PBOC encourage the use of
third-party review and certification attesting to the use of bond proceeds,
the validity of the issuer’s environmental policies, and the reliability of the
issuer’s internal processes for managing allocation of loan proceeds.189
In December 2015, the PBOC issued a “Green Bond Endorsed Project
Catalogue,” which was developed in consultation with four other central-
level agencies, domestic and international organizations, including the IFC,
and leading financial institutions.190  The Catalogue, which China’s stock
exchanges rely on to identify green-eligible projects, directly references
leading international standards, including the Green Bond Principles
(GBP) and the Climate Bonds Initiative Taxonomy.191  It provides detailed
criteria for six project categories appropriate for funding through the issu-
ance of green bonds, ranging from energy conservation to clean transporta-
185. Id. Interview with green bond assurance consultant, Syntao Green Finance, in
Beijing (July 2017) [hereinafter Interview with Syntao green bond consultant].
186. Stephen Park, Investors as Regulators: Green Bonds and the Governance Challenges
of the Sustainable Finance Revolution, 54 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (2018).
187. Interview with Syntao green bond consultant, supra note 185 (discussing
NAFMII’s rules).  China’s National Association of Financial Market Institutional Inves-
tors (NAFMII) is a self-regulatory organization that develops rules for the interbank
bond market and has established an over-the-counter debt exchange for the interbank
market. See NAFMII, About us, http://www.nafmii.org.cn/english/ [https://perma.cc/
RR64-WRMH].
188. See PBOC, Announcement of the Administrative Measures for the Issuance of
Financial Bonds in the National Inter-Bank Bond Market & Green Bond Endorsed Pro-
ject Catalogue, No. 39, Dec. 12, 2015; NDRC, supra note 89.
189. NDRC, supra note 89, at para. 3.  KPMG, supra note 181, at 62.  Green bond
issuances typically require a third-party certification as to the green attributes of the
bonds, in addition to standard third-party auditor assurances. CLIMATE BONDS INITIATIVE
& CHINA CENT. DEP. CLEARING CO., CHINA GREEN BOND MARKET 2016 11 (2017).  At
present, NDRC approval is based entirely on information provided by the issuer.  Inter-
view with senior official, NDRC, supra note 89 (citing concerns about the cost of third-
party verification).
190. See PBOC, supra note 188.
191. Id.
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tion and renewable energy.192
Standardization of terms and the emergence of market standards for
green bond issuances with the implementation of the 2016 Green Finance
Guidelines are already spurring capacity-building within financial institu-
tions and third-party organizations who can provide certifications of green
bond use of proceeds.  To obtain certification, the assurance provider, typi-
cally an international consultant or accounting firm, must confirm that the
projects to which bond proceeds will be applied are in accordance with the
Green Bond Endorsed Project Catalogue and that they are subject to an
appropriate process for management of proceeds, selection of green
projects, and transparency requirements.  In practice, the assurance pro-
vider also assesses whether the projects comply with relevant environmen-
tal regulations, have obtained regulatory approval, and are supported by
evidence of the environmental benefit they will produce.193  Issuers may
obtain optional post-issuance third-party assurance that the funds have
been allocated to their intended purpose and do not present any major
environmental risks.194  To the extent bond proceeds flow through to com-
mercial lending, third-party assurance requirements will continue to
inform bank oversight and monitoring practice.
III. Green Credit Implementation
The central government’s policy emphasis on expanding green credit
raises important questions about whether it will succeed and the extent to
which other markets can or should replicate aspects of the Chinese
approach.  This study sheds light on these questions by looking at trends
in green credit lending from the period immediately before the most recent
wave of reforms and continuing through the present.
Using a combination of interview data and content analysis of the
public disclosures of commercial banks who currently report on green
credit lending to the CBIRC, I examine the extent to which China’s largest
banks have instituted mechanisms to monitor borrowers’ environmental
credit risk.  In some cases, interview data also permits a preliminary look
at how banks are actually using these mechanisms and what obstacles they
encounter in implementing current green credit policies.  Section A
introduces the specific research questions posed and describes the study’s
methodology.  Section B presents the findings and analysis, and Section C
192. Id.  The PBOC and the NDRC’s standards are broader than these international
green bond standards.  They define “green” to include some types of projects, such as
clean coal and upgrades to fossil fuel plants that international standards exclude.
193. Interview with Syntao green bond consultant, supra note 185.  Two types of
external review are common for new green bond issues: the first relies on an external
organization with environmental expertise, hired by the issuer, to develop an assessment
standard to evaluate the green credentials of the debt and then to render an opinion on
whether the issue complies with that standard.  The second is a third-party verification
of the green credentials of the debt based on the Climate Bonds Standard or another
model. See CHINA GREEN BONDS, supra note 180, at 6– 7 (describing these two types of
assessments).
194. See id.
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addresses its limitations.  Part IV then draws on these findings to make a
preliminary assessment and suggests lessons for sustainable finance
reform more broadly.
A. Research Questions & Methodology
China’s banking sector includes one national development bank, two
policy banks, five state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), twelve joint
stock commercial banks, 134 municipal commercial banks, and over 4,000
other financial institutions.195  Of these, the SOCBs and the joint stock
commercial banks, which are listed in Appendix A, account for nearly 60%
of all financial assets in the Chinese banking system.196  Since 2013, the
CBRC (as of 2018, the CBIRC) has obtained data on green credit financing
and on financing to high polluting and overcapacity sectors from twenty-
one banks, which together account for over 80% of all green credit financ-
ing.197  These include seventeen commercial banks (the SOCBs and joint
stock commercial banks), China Development Bank (CDB), the two policy
banks, and the Postal Savings Bank of China.198  It should be noted that
the CBIRC figures potentially underreport the level of green credit finance,
since these twenty-one banks are the only banks that are currently required
to report on green credit lending volume to the CBIRC.199
This study incorporates all twenty-one banks included in the CBIRC’s
assessment, which contribute to the total reported green credit volume.
These banks represent the top tier of the Chinese banking system.  How-
ever, because the focus of this analysis is on commercial bank corporate
lending, the three policy banks are excluded from much of the analysis
since they do not engage in commercial lending, and therefore, do not
directly finance commercial green credit.  This leaves eighteen banks
remaining in the primary sample.  Because environmental and social risk
management is also an integral part of policy banks’ role in development
finance, information regarding the policy banks is discussed separately
where relevant below.
195. CBRC 2016 REPORT, supra note 8, at 25.  On the history of these institutions, see R
TAN, supra note 94, at 17– 26. R
196. CBRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 9, at 26. See also Wen Ya ( ), China’s Banking R
Industry Green Credit Exceeds 8 Trillion Yuan ( ,
XINHUA (June 24, 2016), http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2016-06/24/c_11191081
17.htm [https://perma.cc/M7KR-GFY4] (reporting updated statistics from the CBRC for
2015).
197. CBRC 2016 REPORT, supra note 8, at 30. See also CBRC NOTES, supra note 11, at R
115 (listing these banks).  The Green Credit Statistics System (GCSS) requires banks to R
categorize banks to report and categorize green credit loans, and to quantify the environ-
mental benefits they produce. See id. (citing two administrative notices of the CBRC
from 2013 and 2014 that are the basis of this system).
198. The Postal Savings Bank is a joint stock company that, as of 2016, is publicly
traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  Its focus is on serving small and medium
commercial clients, rural clients, and those in the agricultural sector. POSTAL SAVINGS
BANK, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2017).
199. Others are required to report to the CBRC’s regional offices. See CBRC NOTES,
supra note 11, at 1.
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The particular research questions addressed in this study are as
follows:
(i) What is the level of green credit the top Chinese banks issue, and what
observations can be made from recent trends?;
(ii) Do banks view green credit and environmental risk assessment as part
of their core business model, or do they engage in green credit prima-
rily in support of the government’s current development policies?;
(iii) What environmental credit risk policies and practices have banks
implemented, and what capacity constraints or other factors impact
their ability to monitor borrowers’ environmental practices and assess
credit risk?;
(iv) To what extent are banks able to spread or shift environmental credit
risk?; and
(v) To what extent do international standards influence green credit imple-
mentation by Chinese banks?
To answer these questions, this study relies first on a content analysis
of the annual reports and sustainability reports of the eighteen banks (i.e.
seventeen commercial banks and the Postal Savings Bank) that reported
green credit data to the CBRC for fiscal years 2012– 2016, other than the
policy banks.  Annual reports and sustainability reports for earlier years
were also obtained, but most banks produced limited and inconsistent data
prior to 2012.200  Data from the 2012– 2016 reports were coded and ana-
lyzed based on multiple indicators, identified in Section B below, that
relate to each of the research questions.  Appendix B shows the results of
this analysis, together with the number of banks reporting each indicator
for the three most recent years (2014– 2016).201  All of the banks included
in this sample produce annual financial reports, and sixteen of the banks
also produce sustainability reports; Hengfeng Bank is one of the two banks
that do not produce a sustainability report, but it includes some informa-
tion on green credit in its annual report.  Banks generally report quantita-
tive data on green finance and descriptions of ECRM processes almost
entirely in their sustainability reports.
Investigating how banks assess and price risk of any kind is challeng-
ing because financial institutions’ client relationships, the details of inter-
nal credit assessment policies and models, and data on enforcement of
loan covenants are proprietary and not a matter of public record.  The con-
tent, implementation, and outcomes of risk management policies, credit
evaluations, and lending decisions are similarly within the black box of an
institution’s internal operations.  Banks discuss the existence and scope of
ECRM systems and offer indications of the priority of environmental risk
200. Two banks in this study— Zheshang Bank and Hengfeng Bank— do not produce
sustainability reports, although Hengfeng includes sustainability information in its
annual report.  Reported results are, therefore, more limited for these banks.
201. The CBRC has encouraged Chinese financial institutions to adopt CSR indica-
tors and to produce regular sustainability reports. See supra note 91 and sources cited R
therein.  The China Banking Association (CBA) and the China Trustee Association
(CTA) have also adopted their own guidelines for CSR reporting by their membership.
See CBRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 9, at 163– 64. R
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management in their annual reports.  But their annual reports do not
include detailed information on how the banks implement ECRM policies,
nor do banks disclose any information regarding implementation chal-
lenges in their public disclosures.
This study fills some of these gaps with insights gleaned from inter-
views with CBRC and NDRC officials, bank representatives, lawyers, aca-
demics, consultants, and representatives of the IFC who have been involved
in developing, implementing, or advising on the implementation of China’s
green finance policies.  As indicated in Appendix E, all interviews were
conducted between 2016 and 2017 in Hong Kong, Beijing, and Shanghai;
bank representatives included managers from four branches and one bank
headquarters.  The interviewees’ areas of responsibility ranged from senior
management (including one branch president), to mid-level managers
responsible for bank strategy, environmental risk assessment, and direct
client relationships.  Although most interviewees worked with the SOEs
and other large clients typical of top-tier Chinese banks, two worked in
departments serving primarily small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME)
clients.  I also interviewed bank personnel at international banks not
included in this study who were familiar with the Chinese context.  As is
typical in research of this sort, interviewees were identified primarily
through personal contacts and so are not intended to reflect a representa-
tive sample of similar professionals or banks.
B. Analysis
This Section presents the findings with regard to the research ques-
tions identified above.  The results of the content analysis of the banks’
public reports provide evidence of green credit volume, the priority banks
place on green credit and ECRM specifically, and the extent of implementa-
tion.  Interviews and further documentary research suggest answers to the
remaining research questions regarding banks’ capacity constraints, limita-
tions, and ability to shift environmental credit risk, as well as the extent to
which Chinese banks have adopted international standards.
1. Green Credit Volume
To determine whether Chinese banks are able to implement green
credit policies, a basic starting point is the volume of green credit they
issue.  Green credit is a subset of the corporate loan volume for commercial
banks and is measured as a ratio of the total corporate loan balance.202
Since 2012, the total green credit lending for all Chinese banks has hovered
at nearly 10% of their commercial lending volume, as illustrated in Table 1
below.  These figures represent an exponential increase over the past dec-
202. The CBRC’s annual report appears to report green credit volume as a percentage
of total loans, but CBRC officials confirm that these figures are in fact a ratio of green
credit corporate loans.  Interview with senior official, CBRC, supra note 150.  These
figures are based on the reported green credit balance for a given year rather than the
total green credit loan volume (cumulatively) of each bank, which most banks also
report.
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ade and an average annual increase of over 12% since 2012.203  As of 2016,
the total green credit loan volume for banks in the sample averaged 8.9% of
their total corporate loan balance, which is a subset of the banks’ total loan
volume.204  In the aggregate, green credit for the commercial banks report-
ing this data stands at over RMB 3.7 trillion (over USD 530 billion) and
accounts for over half of all green credit financed by Chinese banks.205
China’s policy banks and CDB together issue the remainder of reported
green credit volume.206
The range of variation annually is quite high: at China Construction
Bank, green credit accounted for 15% of its total corporate loan volume in
2016, the highest in the sample, as compared to China Minsheng Bank,
where green credit was less than 1% of its corporate loan balance in 2015
and 2016.207  As Table 2 below and Table C-1 in Appendix C indicate,
most of the banks whose multi-year data is available reported modest
increases in their level of green credit lending over the past three years.
Leaving aside the policy banks, three-quarters (13) of the banks in this
study also quantify their level of lending to highly polluting firms or firms
in industries identified by the CBIRC as “overcapacity” sectors— in other
words, the “two high, one overcapacity” (lianggao yisheng ”) sec-
tors, which I refer to here as “black” loans— during at least one of the
reporting years.208  In 2016, black loans accounted for 3.8% of all corpo-
rate loans on average for the banks in this sample.  A higher percentage of
the banks (58% in 2016) report that they have recalled or denied funding
to projects in these sectors in response to recent state policies urging banks
to restrict lending to these sectors.  According to the CBIRC, credit restric-
tions to the “two high, one overcapacity” sectors have resulted in restricting
RMB 1.8 trillion in financing, with some banks reporting no financing to
203. CBRC STATISTICS, supra note 8 (2013– 2017). See also CBRC, ANNUAL REPORTS R
(various years).  In 2007, the total amount of green credit loans was approximately RMB
10.6 billion, as compared to over RMB 7 trillion at the end of 2016. See Zhang et al.,
supra note 8, at 1322.  Part of this increase may be attributable to a higher rate of report- R
ing or changing definitions of green credit during the period, in addition to increases in
green loans disbursed.  Banks participating in a syndicated lending arrangement may
only count their own contribution to the financing as part of their green credit volume.
See Interview with senior official, CBRC, supra note 150.
204. Although the limited number of banks included in this sample is too small to
confirm statistical significance, green credit lending volume does not appear to be corre-
lated with the size of the bank (measured either in terms of total loan volume or total
assets). See CBRC STATISTICS, supra note 8 (various years).
205. This figure is as compared to the 2016 year-end of approximately RMB 7.5 tril-
lion, which includes green loans by the policy banks. See CBRC 2015 REPORT, supra
note 9, at 63.  Zheshang Bank and Hengfeng Bank do not report their green credit R
volume.
206. In 2016, nearly RMB 1.6 trillion in green credit was issued by China Develop-
ment Bank (CDB) alone. CDB, 2016 SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 53 (2017).
207. China Industrial Bank (CIB) reports on its aggregate green finance volume, a
broader category not limited to green credit; green finance for CIB accounted for nearly
40% of its corporate loan volume in 2016. Compare CIB, 2016 ANNUAL SUSTAINABILITY
REPORT 57 (2017), with CHINA CONSTRUCTION BANK (CCB), 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 38, 74
(2017), and CDB, supra note 206, at 48, 201.
208. See AUDIT STANDARDS, supra note 149, at app. IV (listing these 29 sectors).
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these sectors in 2015, the most recent year for which this data is availa-
ble.209  Table 3 below and Table C-2 in Appendix C report the balance of
“black credit” as a percentage of total corporate loan volume for the banks
that provide this data.  Although some banks report increases in the vol-
ume of black credit in certain years between 2012 and 2016, black credit
loan volumes as a percentage of corporate lending declined over this
period.210  Table 1 shows the average green credit loan balance and black
credit loan balance as a percentage of corporate loan volume.211
Table 1: Average Green Credit & Black Credit as Percentage of
Corporate Loans (2012– 2016)
-
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6.00
8.00
10.00
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
 Green credit loan balance %  Black credit loan balance %
209. Wen, supra note 196, at 1– 2.  The CBRC’s 2015 Annual Report puts the figure at
RMB 1.6 trillion. See CBRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 9, at 75. R
210. Tbl. 1. Compare CBRC, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 35– 36 (2014), with CBRC 2015
REPORT, supra note 9, at 75. Accurate assessments of loan volumes to polluting sectors
are difficult because of the inclusion of “overcapacity” sectors in the reported figures.
211. Some banks report a “black credit loan ratio” (i.e. percentage) or black credit
loan volume but do not clarify whether it is determined as a percentage of the corporate
loan balance or of total lending.  The black credit loan percentage would be smaller if
reported relative to total lending.
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Table 2: Green Credit as Percentage of Corporate Loans —  Commercial
Banks & Postal Bank (2014– 2016)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Ch
in
a I
nd
us
tri
al 
Ba
nk
Ch
in
a C
on
str
uc
tio
n 
Ba
nk
In
du
str
ial
 an
d 
Co
m
m
er
cia
l B
an
k 
of
 C
hi
na
 (I
CB
C)
Ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l B
an
k 
of
 C
hi
na
Ba
nk
 o
f C
hi
na
Sh
an
gh
ai 
Pu
do
ng
 D
ev
elo
pm
en
t B
an
k
Ch
in
a M
er
ch
an
ts 
Ba
nk
Po
sta
l S
av
in
gs
 B
an
k 
of
 C
hi
na
Ba
nk
 o
f B
eij
in
g
Ch
in
a B
oh
ai 
Ba
nk
Ba
nk
 o
f C
om
m
un
ica
tio
ns
Hu
a X
ia 
Ba
nk
Ch
in
a E
ve
rb
rig
ht
 B
an
k
Pi
ng
 A
n 
Ba
nk
Ch
in
a C
IT
IC
 B
an
k
Ch
in
a M
in
sh
en
g B
an
k
2014 2015 2016
Table 3: Black Credit as Percentage of Corporate Loans —  Commercial
Banks (2014– 2016)
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According to bank representatives and advisors interviewed for this
study, most banks base their determinations on the 2012 Green Credit
Guidelines; some banks also confirm this in their most recent sus-
tainability reports.212  All of the banks in this study should also be identi-
fying “green” loans and quantifying the reported environmental benefits of
212. Per the 2012 Guidelines, green credit loan volume is debt capital used to finance
firms and projects that produce environmental benefits, including emissions reduction
or pollution remediation. See GREEN CREDIT GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 1.  Prior to R
2016, no banks in the sample indicated in their reports how they determined green
credit volume.
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those loans, such as reduced carbon emissions, in line with the CBIRC’s
Green Credit Statistics System.  However, prior to 2016, few of the reports,
contain any footnotes or other explanation confirming that this was the
case, and reporting practices between 2012 and 2014 exhibit some degree
of variability.  Moreover, because green credit policies are currently non-
binding, each bank must set its own internal policies to determine which
investments to designate as green credit, albeit with reference to the
CBIRC’s guidance.
Another important caution is that the volume of green credit is only a
rough proxy for the extent of environmental credit risk assessment.  Nearly
all banks in the study have implemented basic environmental compliance
thresholds for issuing commercial loans, but the CBIRC encourages banks
to conduct differentiated environmental credit risk screening so that invest-
ments in high-polluting or overcapacity sectors are subject to more exten-
sive monitoring than those in “green” sectors.213  As a result, not all loans
that are subject to stricter ECRM standards are “green,” and some green
loans may not be subject to post-issuance environmental monitoring at
all.214
2. Green Credit Priority & Materiality
Although Chinese banks must respond to state policy priorities, they
may be less willing to monitor borrowers’ environmental and social risk
over the long term if they are implementing green credit solely in support
of national development policy or under the auspices of general corporate
social responsibility than if their own economic interests align with these
policies.  While all of the banks in this sample are pursuing green finance
for policy reasons to some extent,215 many are also beginning to integrate
green credit and environmental risk assessment into their core business
models, trends that are particularly evident in how banks report on green
credit implementation in 2016, even as compared to 2014 and 2015.  Key
indicators of banks’ own view of the financial materiality of environmental
factors are the level of board oversight of ECRM functions, banks’ own envi-
ronmental practice, and whether banks link green credit or ECRM to finan-
cial performance.
a. Corporate Governance
Per the CBRC’s 2014 Audit Standards, banks that place a higher prior-
ity on green credit should integrate environmental and social risk manage-
ment or sustainability functions into standard corporate governance
structures, for example by designating a committee or the full board to
213. See AUDIT STANDARDS, supra note 149, at 7 (directing banks to distinguish invest-
ments across three categories based on environmental risk).
214. As discussed below, untested “green” projects require banks to focus more heav-
ily on whether the project is profitable than on its environmental impact. See text
accompanying notes 262– 65, infra.
215. Interview with green finance consultant, IFC, supra note 131 (reporting that this
is the case for most banks involved in IFC green finance capacity building programs).
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exercise environmental and social risk oversight.216  The commercial
banks in this sample all indicated that they have implemented the basic
corporate governance, risk management, and formal internal controls
structures that are required by law and that serve as the foundation for
environmental and social credit risk monitoring.
However, few banks in this study assign responsibility for green credit
to specific governance units.  Only six of the banks in the sample (33%)
charge either the full board or a board committee with responsibility for
environmental and social risk oversight.217  This confirms the findings of
earlier studies showing that mainland banks exhibit a “lack of board lead-
ership on environmental and social issues.”218
b. Financial Materiality
Another indicator of the extent to which banks view environmental
credit risk as material is the degree to which green credit or environmental
risk management appears in the annual reports, and whether they appear
in the social responsibility or policy sections of the report, or instead in the
annual report’s sections discussing risk management, corporate govern-
ance, or financial performance.  For all banks, the primary data source on
green credit implementation is the environmental section of the bank’s sus-
tainability report, alongside other parts of the report showcasing support
for other central government priorities such as poverty alleviation, regional
economic development, and China’s massive global investment initiative,
the “Belt and Road.”  Sustainability reports also highlight bank efforts to
reduce their own environmental impacts, promote e-banking, contribute to
charity, or finance SMEs and rural agriculture.
Although detailed discussion of green credit programs is almost uni-
versally reserved for the sustainability reports, 12 of the 18 banks (67%)
directly reference green credit or corporate responsibility in their annual
reports.  Some of these also include environmental key performance
indicators in the annual report.219  However, prior to 2015, references in
the annual reports were limited to brief mention of green credit and “black
credit” volume.  Narrative discussion, if any, was limited to the parts of the
annual report devoted to corporate social responsibility or public policy
issues.  However, between 2015 and 2016, several banks began to reference
green credit and environmental credit risk more directly in their standard
216. AUDIT STANDARDS, supra note 149, art. 7– 9.
217. One of these banks is China Construction Bank (CCB), which has established a
multi-departmental green credit committee, which reports to its board’s corporate social
responsibility committee. See CCB, supra note 207, at 102.  Bank of Communications
(BOC) has tasked its CSR board committee with green credit policy oversight. See BOC,
ANNUAL REPORT 146 (2016).  As of 2015, only China Industrial Bank (CIB) had placed
environmental and social risk oversight functionally under the direct supervision of the
full Board of Directors rather than a separate committee. See CIB, 2015 SUSTAINABILITY
REPORT 57 (2016).
218. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 13, at 11.
219. Many banks include core financial ratios and economic indicators in their sus-
tainability reports as indicators of their responsibility to shareholders.
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disclosures on corporate lending, risk management, credit risk, and other
core aspects of the directors’ report contained in the annual report.220
These developments are noteworthy since financial institutions worldwide
generally include only limited environmental disclosure in their annual
reports, if at all.221
c. Market Opportunities & Stakeholder Orientation
Research on Chinese bank practice from the mid-2000s indicates that
market opportunities also motivate banks to improve their risk manage-
ment systems and expand their investment in green sectors.222  References
in the banks’ public reports to stakeholder engagement are therefore an
indication that banks place a higher priority on environmental and social
concerns, since environmental and social issues impact the banks’ custom-
ers, local communities, and other external stakeholders.  Banks that seek
to reduce their own environmental impacts and that publicly report on
their own sustainability records may also be better positioned to monitor
borrowers’ environmental risks.
Banks in this sample rank relatively high on measures related to their
own environmental footprints and disclosure practices, which the 2014
Green Credit Audit Standards encourage.  Every bank in this study
monitors and reports on its own environmental performance and stake-
holder impact in its sustainability report, many with quantitative three-year
lagged data on resource conservation and their carbon footprints.  As
Appendix B indicates, half of the banks currently report on their “social
contribution[s] per share,”  a metric developed by the Shanghai Stock
Exchange as a way to distill in a single number companies’ contributions to
both shareholders and external stakeholders.223  Bank monitoring of their
own environmental impact is not equivalent to effective environmental
credit risk management, but it does indicate an understanding of how to
assess operational environmental risks and impacts.
220. See, e.g., HENGFENG BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 51 (2016) (discussing green credit
within the report’s standard credit risk section).
221. See TCFD, PHASE I REPORT 13 (2017), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/publications/
phase-i/ [https://perma.cc/L6LA-DYVF] (finding that few existing voluntary and
mandatory reporting regimes apply to the financial sector, beyond those that may apply
under stock exchange listing rules).
222. See, e.g., Yong Liu & Zhongguo Lin, Understanding the External Pressure and
Behavior of Commercial Banks’ Environmental Risk Management: An Empirical Study
Undertaken in the Yangtze River Delta of China, 43 ROYAL SWED. ACAD. SCI. REPORT 395,
400– 01, 403 (2014).
223. According to the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), social contribution value per
share = earnings per share + value increase per share; value increase per share = (annual
taxes payable + staff remuneration + interest paid to creditors + corporate donations –
other social costs)/total shares.  In 2016, this number was highest (RMB 12.12/share)
for CIB, which may suggest that banks with a higher proportion of their loan business in
green credit may be overall sustainability leaders. CIB, 2016 ANNUAL SUSTAINABILITY
REPORT, supra note 207, at 16. However, those with a green credit loan ratio nearer the
average, such as Merchants’ Bank, also had a high social contribution measure (RMB
7.98/share). MERCHANTS’ BANK 2016 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 13 (2017). Other fac-
tors may explain this result.
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3. Environmental Credit Risk Management & Risk Pricing
The level of ECRM implementation reported by leading banks varies
widely and appears to relate to size and, therefore, to overall capacity.224
Despite intense policy emphasis on green credit in recent years, ECRM is in
its early stages at even the largest banks.  According to a number of consul-
tants who advise banks on green credit practice, smaller municipal com-
mercial banks do not yet have the capacity, and in some cases even lack
basic policies, to implement green credit lending.225  At the same time, the
findings here confirm that many of the largest banks are working to
develop more sophisticated ECRM processes.226  China Development Bank
and China Export-Import Bank also report instituting internal environmen-
tal and social risk review processes.227
To assess banks’ level of ECRM implementation, I apply here the
indicators developed by the UNEP-FI to the policies and practices reported
in the banks’ annual and sustainability reports and to those reported in
direct interviews with bank personnel.228  These indicators include
whether the bank has established green credit policies; whether its credit
risk assessment includes environmental and social factors; and whether it
adopts contractual or other tools to monitor borrowers’ environmental
risks.  At present, the emphasis for most banks’ green credit programs is on
meeting green credit targets set by bank management, showing declines in
the level of “black” credit finance, and demonstrating banks’ commitment
to financing green sectors.  Banks often limit ECRM to clients or projects in
environmentally high-risk sectors.
a. ECRM Policies & Implementation
As indicated in Appendix B, all but one of the surveyed banks report
adoption of green credit policies as of 2016.229  However, with limited
exceptions, the surveyed banks’ annual or sustainability reports do not
detail the nature and scope of these green credit policies or the process for
environmental risk monitoring.  Sustainability reports tend to emphasize
case studies and basic trends in green credit volume and do not disclose
barriers that might limit the banks’ ability to issue green credit or to moni-
tor borrowers.
Eleven banks (61%) report that they incorporate environmental or
social risk factors into credit risk assessment in some form, whether by
224. An IFC internal assessment of its banks clients’ due diligence processes found
similarly wide variability.  Interview with green finance consultant, IFC, supra note 131.
225. Interview with Syntao green bond consultant, supra note 185.
226. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 13, at 61 (noting that banks have his-
torically relied largely on EIAs but are moving to more robust risk identification and risk
management).
227. China Export-Import Bank’s processes are based on the IFC’s Performance Stan-
dards. See IFC, supra note 125, at 36.
228. These stages are discussed in Jensen & Meckling, supra note 71, at 308, 312– 13;
UNEP-FI GUIDE, 1st ed., supra note 73, at 19, 21– 22 and accompanying text.
229. This finding is consistent with earlier studies. See Zhang et al. supra note 8, at R
1324 (reporting that as of 2008, most banks had adopted a green credit policy).
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ranking clients in terms of these measures or by directly integrating these
factors into the due diligence process.  Over one-third report that they
engage in environmental risk monitoring.  These findings represent a sig-
nificant change since 2010, when prior research found that most banks did
not have specific units that focused on green credit and that most lacked
environmental credit risk management systems.230  However, IFC person-
nel who routinely advise Chinese banks on ECRM implementation still
report that most of their clients “feel [ECRM] is too demanding.”231
In general, ECRM is currently limited to pre-issuance compliance
screening, which includes confirming that an environmental impact
assessment (EIA) has been approved and that all relevant permits have
been granted; that the project is otherwise in compliance with environmen-
tal regulations; and that the borrower is not on a blacklist for prior environ-
mental violations.232  Half of the banks report that they deny or
discontinue financing to companies or projects that are penalized for envi-
ronmental violations, a policy that the CBRC originally introduced in 2007
known as “one vote veto.”233  For example, the Agricultural Bank of
China’s 2016 Annual Report states:
As for those who failed to pass the certification of the environment author-
ity, the Bank resolutely refused to do business with them.  As for those who
were highly exposed to the environmental and social risks, such as relating
to environmental protection litigations, administrative penalties and nega-
tive press reports, the Bank would timely lower the customers’ classification
and actively cut their credit exposure.234
To conduct pre-issuance and ongoing due diligence, banks rely to
some extent on self-reporting by the corporate borrower.235  For example,
the EIA and evidence of compliance with project-related permitting rules
230. Id. at 1325.  The study did note that, as of 2010, at least two commercial banks
had already established a “nationwide system for identification, supervision, feedback,
and disposal of environmental protection information” on corporate clients, relying
largely on information obtained from local EPBs. Id. at 1325– 26 (citing examples from
ICBC and ABC, and finding based on a survey in Jiangsu Province that “environmental
authorities are only willing to provide limited public information about most environ-
mental laws.  Information is either not available or is not timely provided.  Moreover,
information on the business environment is not updated.”).
231. Interview with green finance consultant, IFC, supra note 131.
232. Interview with sustainable finance consultants, Syntao Green Finance, in Beijing
(July 2017) [hereinafter Interview with Syntao Sustainable Finance Consultants].  In
2016, Minsheng Bank reported that it requires EIAs for all corporate lending. See MIN-
SHENG BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 200 (2016).  China Development Bank has adopted the
same requirement since 2013. See CDB, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 92 (2015).
233. SEPA et al., supra note 114.
234. AGRICULTURAL BANK OF CHINA, ANNUAL REPORT 58 (2016).
235. In 2016, the NDRC issued an amended Clean Production Audit Notice for firms
in resource-intensive, hazardous, or highly polluting sectors that requires them to insti-
tute a self-audit and reporting framework for certain environmental impacts, in addition
to environmental audits by environmental authorities.  Measures for Clean Production
Review ( ), Order No. 38 (promulgated by the NDRC, May 16, 2016,
effective July 1, 2016).  This framework is encouraged for other industries and creates
an online report that financial institutions can use to assess environmental and social
credit risk. See id. art. 7– 8.  Other information on environmental risk and performance
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are generally provided by the client.  In addition, some banks conduct
online searches pre-issuance to look for evidence of environmental inci-
dents involving the borrower.236  This is consistent with international prac-
tice, where environmental risk analysis depends heavily on publicly
available environmental data.237
However, banks measure environmental risk largely based on informa-
tion about the prospective borrower’s environmental violations obtained
directly from local environmental protection bureaus (EPBs)238 or from
China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment, which aggregates informa-
tion reported by the EPBs.239  Because the MEE’s own data is inconsistent,
some banks rely on information from the Institute of Public and Environ-
mental Affairs (IPE), a domestic NGO which consolidates data from local
EPBs on borrowers’ environmental compliance.240  More useful sources in
the future may be rating systems like those Jiangsu Province has developed,
which the provincial-level EPBs administer.  Under this system, the EPBs
assign a color to companies based on their environmental risks, and those
with “red” or “black” status are not allowed to obtain credit from banks.241
A growing number of Chinese companies also include some form of envi-
ronmental disclosures within environmental, sustainability, or CSR
reports, but neither prior studies nor interviewees in this study indicate
that they rely on these reports in assessing credit risk.
that may be obtained publicly or from the client include receipt of an environmental
award, or certification of an environmental management system under ISO 14000.
236. Interview with branch managers, Bank A, in Shanghai (July 2017).
237. G20 GREEN FINANCE STUDY GROUP, supra note 3, at 4, 12– 13 (defining this data R
as all environmental data provided by non-corporate sources).
238. EPBs maintain databases of penalties levied against companies for environmen-
tal violations, as well as online portals for citizens to report environmental violations.
See MINISTRY OF ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT (MEE), Administrative Penalties, http://
www.mee.gov.cn/home/pgt/xzcf/(last visited Oct. 15, 2018).  This data includes impo-
sition of administrative penalties, evidence of a clean production audit, records on sew-
age or pollutant emissions, and the incidence of events with significant environmental
impact.  Zhang et al., supra note 8, at 1325.  China’s amended Environmental Protection R
Law and earlier environmental regulations require environmental disclosure, although
some reporting requirements apply broadly and others are limited to large polluters and
companies involved in major environmental incidents. See PBOC ET AL., ESTABLISHING
CHINA’S GREEN FINANCIAL SYSTEM: DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS 14: MAKE ENVIRONMENTAL
DISCLOSURE MANDATORY 2– 3, 5 (2015), http://unepinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/04/ECGFS_Detailed_Recommendation_14_Mandatory_Disclosure.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T32D-V5PJ] (summarizing these requirements).
239. Zhang et al., supra note 8, at 1325.  Publicly traded companies are required to R
disclose the potential impact of environmental regulations on their operations and to
report material information regarding environmental investigations and any administra-
tive or criminal penalties, but this type of information is not granular enough nor timely
enough to inform lending decisions for a particular borrower.
240. Interview with Syntao Sustainable Finance Consultants, supra note 232 (report-
ing that ICBC, SPDB, and CIB reference IPE data).  Some banks use blacklists created by
NGOs to screen clients for environmental violations. See, e.g., CIB, supra note 217, at 57
(reporting reliance on data from an NGO in Fujian).
241. One study of twelve commercial banks in Jiangsu Province found that banks
relied heavily on this system. See Zhang et al. supra note 8, at 1324– 25 (reporting that in R
2009 about 4% of the approximately 16,000 companies rated in the system had a red or
black rating under the Jiangsu system).
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In addition to environmental due diligence, some of the banks in this
study indicate that they have adopted monitoring practices that span the
life of the loan and track the UNEP-FI framework phases.  For example,
Huaxia Bank and CIB sustainability reports include schematic drawings of
how environmental risk assessment is integrated within the bank’s man-
agement structure and how it applies throughout the lending cycle.242
Another example is Minsheng Bank, which describes its process as follows:
[For] industries with high pollution, the Bank clarifies environmental and
social risk assessment standards and compliance examination lists, carrying
on full process examination in the aspects of due diligence investigation,
compliance examination, credit line approval, contract management, fund
appropriation, and post-loan management. . . . Minsheng Bank enhances
risk management and control in the aspects of policy orientation, customer
access, risk limits, loan origination, and post-loan management.243
CIB, a green finance leader, has instituted an environmental credit risk
monitoring process that includes 300 qualitative key performance indica-
tors (KPIs) on its clients’ risk management.244  Internal staff review nearly
all corporate lending against the Equator Principles’ environmental and
social standards.245  CIB also retains external consultants to conduct pre-
issuance environmental audits and site visits on most of its corporate
loans, since its clients generally fall within the sectors deemed high or
moderately high risk under the CBRC Audit Standards.246  CIB branches
conduct their own post-issuance review, which resulted in over 3,000 risk
warnings to the bank’s clients in 2016.247
Bank disclosures and interviews with bank personnel confirm that
many banks now rank projects or borrowers according to their potential
environmental impacts following the CBRC Audit Standards, and that they
use contractual monitoring provisions for environmental risk, at least for
projects designated as higher risk.248  These contractual provisions, which
are based on the CBRC’s recommended contract terms excerpted in Appen-
dix D, include covenants to provide ongoing disclosure regarding the
funded projects’ environmental and social risk, as well as post-issuance
creditor monitoring rights and remedies.  The CBIRC also uses data from
242. See HUAXIA BANK, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 36– 37 (2015); CIB, supra note 207, at
20, 29, 54– 55.
243. MINSHENG BANK, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 34 (2015).
244. CIB, supra note 207, at 56.
245. Interview with headquarters manager, Bank C, in Beijing (July 2017).  According
to CIB’s sustainability reports, the bank applied the Equator Principles to forty-nine
projects in 2016, totaling over RMB 581 billion in investment. CIB, supra note 207, at
84.
246. Interview with headquarters manager, Bank C, supra note 245.
247. Id. CIB, supra note 207, at 56 (reporting post-loan risk rectification by twenty-
four companies).
248. Interview with branch division managers, Bank B, in Shanghai (July 2017).  This
bank’s form contract for high-risk sectors includes several covenants on environmental
risk and compliance. See, e.g., HUAXIA BANK, supra note 242, at 36– 37 (discussing the
bank’s use of contractual covenants to require information disclosure of high-risk cli-
ents’ environmental and social risk management).
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the MEE to maintain a quarterly credit blacklist of companies with out-
standing environmental violations; this list may trigger some banks to con-
duct a risk inspection of a current borrower and to potentially withhold
future funding.249
Part of the impetus for banks to implement ECRM practices comes
from the government’s recent efforts to control pollution and tighten fund-
ing to sectors with “high overcapacity.”  As a number of interviewees noted,
these policies increase the direct risk of default on outstanding loans when
firms are shut down or face regulatory penalties.250  Indeed, the 2014
amendments to China’s Environmental Protection Law increased potential
sanctions against polluting firms and expanded the space for environmen-
tal litigation.251  Although the CBRC’s earliest rules required lenders to
restrict credit for companies with environmental violations, it is only with
tightened enforcement that these standards become relevant to commercial
lending.252  Lending to firms in polluting or “overcapacity” sectors also
involves a form of political risk, because of the unpredictability of how and
when the government decides to penalize polluting firms.253  Market
changes have an impact as well, as lenders are also responding to the real-
ity that certain sectors, such as steel production and other heavy indus-
tries, face worsening prospects in a changing economy.254
b. Obstacles to Implementation & Risk Pricing
Despite commercial banks’ progress in establishing ECRM processes,
they nonetheless confront a number of obstacles to implementing ECRM
and setting interest rates to reflect environmental risk. The primary barri-
ers are limited capacity to undertake ECRM analysis, especially at the
branch level,255 and the lack of reliable information that can be readily
integrated into a credit risk assessment.  Even if these constraints were to
249. See, e.g., BOC, supra note 217, at 129, 163, 220 (describing its internal green
credit rating process and post-disbursement enforcement). See also CHINA CITIC BANK,
SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 70 (2015) (discussing its use of the list for new clients).
250. Interview with Syntao Sustainable Finance Consultants, supra note 232.  For
example, one study notes that even in the 1990s, “the Agricultural Bank of China lent a
considerable amount of money to SMEs [but that] the government forced closure on
many SMEs [for environmental pollution]” which caused serious losses to the bank.  Liu
& Lin, supra note 222, at 395 n.1.
251. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO HUANJING BAOHU FA ( )
[ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 24, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015), art. 58,
59 (authorizing public interest litigation brought by certain social organizations and
daily accrual of fines and penalties, respectively).
252. See SEPA et al., supra note 114.
253. These concerns were raised by multiple respondents interviewed in this study.
254. Some banks report that their NPLs, not surprisingly, are concentrated in such
sectors. See, e.g., MINSHENG BANK, supra note 232, at 53.
255. The credit review for high-risk or high-value projects is typically done at both the
branch and headquarters level, but not all banks have yet integrated their risk assess-
ment processes.  This was reported to be the practice by most of the bank representatives
interviewed for this study.
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be addressed, banks’ competitive environment and client base also limit
their ability to price environmental risk.
The lack of high-quality, comparable data is one of the most critical
challenges to a market-driven green credit model.256  EIAs are not designed
for credit risk analysis, and local EPBs do not always provide information
to either lenders or the MEE on a timely or comprehensive basis.257  Local
protectionism in favor of companies who are significant to the local econ-
omy contributes to gaps in the information the MEE itself obtains from
local EPBs.258  The IPE’s data may be more comprehensive, but not all
banks include this data in their due diligence.  Banks must expend
resources to obtain and integrate information from EPBs and third parties,
and without it, banks’ ability to effectively price risk pre-issuance or moni-
tor it post-issuance is limited.
Another fundamental challenge to greening corporate loans is that the
green credit model depends heavily on lending to relatively high-risk bor-
rowers.259  On the one hand are the more promising clients— the greentech
companies and energy-efficient projects that green credit is expected to
favor.  Many of these investments may be considered “green credit” simply
because of the industry sector the company is in, regardless of whether any
environmental credit risk assessment is conducted.260  More critically,
these are often companies that have uncertain long-term profitability, a
limited credit history, unpredictable cash flows, and few assets that can
collateralize the loan.261  In these cases, banks will prefer to lend to estab-
256. The reasons for the variable reliability and accessibility of information related to
environmental impact and compliance are complex. See generally Alex Wang, Explaining
Environmental Information Disclosure in China, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 865 (2018) (explaining
these challenges).  Understandably, banks’ sustainability reports offer limited informa-
tion on the availability or quality of the information on which they base their credit
determinations.  Zhang et al., supra note 8 (based on an analysis of sustainability reports R
and in-person interviews with commercial banks in Jiangsu province).  The fundamental
importance of reliable information on environmental credit risk has been noted in stud-
ies predating the 2015– 2016 reforms. See, e.g., id. at 1322 (observing that green credit
policy implementation depends on the “amount and quality of corporate environmental
information available to bank lenders”).  Prior studies also uniformly note that informa-
tion deficiencies are the primary obstacle to green credit implementation. See, e.g.,
Aizawa & Yang, supra note 23; Hu & Li, supra note 114; Zhang, et al., supra note 8, at
1325, tbl. 4 (2011).
257. See Arthur P. J. Mol et al., Information Disclosure in Environmental Risk Manage-
ment: Developments in China, 40 J. CURRENT CHINESE AFF. 163, 176– 78 (2011) (present-
ing findings from comprehensive interview and survey research of EPB practices). See
also Wang, supra note 256, at 879, 880, 887.
258. The CBIRC is working with the MEE on reforms that would facilitate aggregation
of environmental data at the provincial level to address this issue.  Interview with senior
official, CBRC, supra note 150.
259. Interview with branch Chief Executive Officer, Bank C, supra note 131.
260. Several banks in this study indicate that they only monitor environmental credit
risk for those in the “two high, one overcapacity” sectors identified by the CBRC.
261. This may be because banks recognize the risks outlined here and so will only
loan to “green” projects where other credit risk indicators are strong, or it may be due to
the fact that some government programs offer subsidies for energy-efficient projects,
which reduces default risk. Id.; interview with Senior operations & CHUEE program
officer, IFC, in Beijing (July 2017); interview with branch division managers, Bank B,
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lished companies with assets or cash flows that can be secured in order to
lower the cost of the debt and ensure repayment.  One common model
involves lending to an energy services company, which then uses the loan
proceeds for equipment that is ultimately used by other entities.262  On the
other hand, many investments that count as “green” because they reduce
pollution or focus on remediation are also inherently high risk because
they involve lending to high polluters and heavy industry sectors that may
be targeted by restructuring or may be vulnerable as market demand shifts.
Many of the companies in both categories will fail, but in such cases, the
source of the default risk has more to do with the financial condition of the
borrower or the projects’ cash flows than with their environmental or
social risk.  Therefore, improving environmental credit risk management
may do little to reduce underlying credit risk.
Whether lenders can effectively monitor corporate borrowers also
depends on the identity of the borrowers and the term of the debt.  SOEs
and large private firms are the primary clients of the banks that are leaders
in green credit implementation.263  Many of the banks in this study who
are active green credit lenders also finance government debt, and some
green credit financing does involve local government partners.264  Finan-
cial institutions’ ability to negotiate against state-sector clients depends on
the state’s interest in the project and the relative position of the bank and
the client in the party-state institutional structure.265  In addition, most
commercial loans are relatively short-term.266  This creates more opportu-
nities for the bank to revisit the loan terms and to identify sources of envi-
ronmental risk,267 but a loan period of only one to three years may deter
some banks from robust pre-issuance or post-issuance due diligence.
The primary reason banks have yet to fully implement ECRM
processes has to do with the problem of pricing risk even when risk can be
reasonably measured in advance.  The International Monetary Fund
supra note 248.  A number of banks report that their NPLs for green credit are low
relative to the NPL rate for all commercial loans. See, e.g., CDB, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT
12, 19, 35, 92 (2014).
262. Interview with senior operations & CHUEE program officer, IFC, supra note
261; interview with headquarters manager, Bank C, supra note 245.
263. This was confirmed by numerous interviewees.  For an example of the collateral-
ization of green credit lending, see, e.g., CHINA EVERBRIGHT BANK, CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 58 (2015) (describing the bank’s support of “the development of
green enterprises by pledging loans based on the expected income right[s] from water
supply, heat supply, power generation, sewage/garbage treatment and other projects”).
264. See SHANGHAI PUDONG DEVELOPMENT BANK, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 52 (2016) (pro-
viding examples).
265. These enforcement challenges are at the heart of other weaknesses in the Chi-
nese banking system. See, e.g., Donald Clark & Fang Lu, The Law of China’s Local Gov-
ernment Debt: Local Government Financing Vehicles and Their Bonds, 65 AM. J. COMP. L.
751 (2017) (discussing the uncertain status of debt obligations issued by local govern-
ment financing vehicles).
266. Interview with lawyer, international law firm banking practice, in Shanghai (July
2017); interview with branch division managers, Bank B, supra note 248.
267. A number of banks in this study report that they prefer to lend on a relatively
short-term basis with the opportunity to renew for up to ten or twenty years.  The lower
risk also lowers interest rates, so clients can access capital more cheaply.
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reports that variation in bank lending rates has increased since China
began liberalizing its interest rate policies in 2012.268  However, bank man-
agers interviewed for this study indicated that while they have the ability to
raise interest rates for projects that are more environmentally risky, doing
so may make their banks less competitive.269  By the same token, lenders
find it difficult to push for tighter covenants or the right to monitor envi-
ronmental outcomes if other banks will not.270
For projects in greentech, renewable energy, or other green sectors,
banks do not offer cheaper financing for projects that offer relatively better
environmental benefits, explaining that they must “cover their costs.”271
As a result, the cost of debt capital does not reflect environmental credit
risk, and borrowers in sectors that account for the bulk of green credit
recipients have no incentive to manage environmental risk or impacts more
efficiently; it is enough that they are in a green line of business.272  The
general consensus of many interviewees is that without PBOC financial
incentives or government subsidies, it is impossible to offer preferential
interest rates for green credit loans.273
4. Environmental Credit Risk Shifting
In addition, the corporate governance literature indicates that credi-
tors’ incentives to engage in monitoring may weaken if they can share risk
with other creditors or shift risk to a third party or to shareholders.274
Green insurance, financial intermediation, and multi-lender financing
structures are all increasingly common forms of risk transfer in China that
complicate the account of direct lender monitoring developed here thus far.
On the other hand, the literature also posits that risk-sharing among multi-
ple lenders or other stakeholders can be value-enhancing when one lender,
268. IMF, supra note 107, at 12– 14. See Tan et al., supra note 94, at 10– 11 & tbl. 1
(detailing reforms between 2012 and 2015).
269. Interview with branch managers, Bank A, supra note 236; interview with head-
quarters department manager, Bank C, in Beijing (July 2017).
270. Interview with green finance consultant, IFC, supra note 131.
271. Interview with branch managers, Bank A, supra note 236; interview with branch
division managers, Bank B, supra note 248.  With limited exceptions, neither the PBOC
nor local governments offer interest rate subsidies or any other financial incentives to
banks or bank clients that could reduce the cost of green lending.
272. Interview with branch managers, Bank A, supra note 236.  The relative benefits
of green credit in environmental terms do not, as of the time of this writing, appear to be
part of bank lending considerations or CBIRC policy.  Interview with senior official,
CBRC, supra note 150.  Local governments in Xiamen have reportedly offered up to a
40% interest rate subsidy for green credit, but these appear to be relatively isolated
examples.  Interview with Syntao Sustainable Finance Consultants, supra note 232.
273. The PBOC introduced policies to incentivize green credit in 2018, including
adjustments to its collateral requirements based on eligible green credit loans and lend-
ing support for green projects; tax incentives for green projects are also being consid-
ered.  Interview with China Banking Association representatives, in Beijing (July 2018);
Kevin Yao, China Central Bank Plans Fresh Incentives to Support Green Financing, REUTERS
(June 16, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-banking-greenfinance/china-
central-bank-plans-fresh-incentives-to-support-green-financing-idUSKBN1970R1 [https:/
/perma.cc/39FV-TGMN].
274. Tung, supra note 17, at 161– 69.
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often a bank, serves as the “designated monitor.”  This approach generates
efficiencies since the designated monitor is generally the party that can
more cheaply obtain information from the borrower and has the greatest
incentives to monitor the borrower’s compliance.275
Getting a sense of how common risk-sharing structures are relative to
the total green credit loan balances of Chinese commercial banks and
whether they facilitate or discourage creditor monitoring is difficult since
neither the CBIRC nor the banks themselves disclose details on how green
credit facilities are structured.  In addition, this study does not examine
how frequently lenders require green insurance, even though green insur-
ance is one pillar of China’s recent green finance reforms and is an impor-
tant form of risk transfer.276
There is evidence, however, that some forms of risk transfer are mask-
ing risk within the Chinese financial system, even though it is unclear how
much these practices affect green credit transactions.  In 2017, the CBRC
began an enforcement drive targeting aggressive risk-taking across the
financial sector and raised concerns about high levels of intermediation
between the initial lender and the ultimate borrower.277  The CBRC also
targeted continued lending to “zombie companies” and urged banks to
improve credit risk management, particularly with respect to risks related
to local government debt and strategies for managing NPLs.278  Expanded
securitization of green loans and the development of new green financial
products may exacerbate these trends even as they shift financial risk away
from bank lenders.279
However, based on the transactions described in interviews and in the
bank sustainability reports reviewed in this study, risk transfer has enabled
many of the banks who are leaders in green credit to reduce their risk expo-
sure and build their own internal risk management capacity.  One key
example of such a program is the IFC’s China Utility-Based Energy Effi-
ciency Finance Program (CHUEE), which began in 2006 and concluded in
2015.280  Under several iterations of the CHUEE Program, which
275. See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 18, at 1090– 92, 1106– 08 (explaining the R
dynamics of delegated monitoring); Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 17, at 1244 (noting R
that the monitoring bank would be the one that holds the largest share of a syndicated
loan).
276. Green insurance includes programs and products that can protect banks who
lend to environmentally risky projects, as well as their clients.  According to a senior
official at the CBRC, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) has been
developing environmental responsibility insurance since 2014 and related policies are
now being implemented in several provinces.  Interview with senior official, CBRC,
supra note 150.
277. See Yun et al., supra note 110. R
278. Id. (noting illegal transfers of performing loans and improper transfer, write-off,
and securitization of NPLs in violation of current regulations).
279. Examples from the U.S. market, where structured finance products built on
home mortgage debt led to the recent financial crisis, illustrate the point. But see Yesha
Yadav, The Case for a Market in Debt Governance, 67 VAND. L. REV. 771 (2014) (arguing
that with appropriate contracting in derivatives markets, credit derivatives could co-exist
with good debt governance).
280. IFC, supra note 125, at 51– 52.
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expanded from energy efficiency to renewable energy and resource conser-
vation projects, the IFC guaranteed loans to joint-stock and municipal com-
mercial banks, in some instances with funding from provincial
governments or central-level agencies, such as the Ministry of Finance and
China’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).281  In most cases, the
World Bank provided up to 50% of the financing, and local banks the other
half, with risk being allocated first to investment vehicles established by
the IFC and the residual to the Chinese commercial bank partner.282
These banks then extended loans to their clients for projects within the
CHUEE Program’s scope, such as facilities upgrades.283  In these exam-
ples, credit facilities were established in partnership with international
lenders who not only bore part of the risk of the transaction but also pro-
vided an experienced source of delegated monitoring.
The IFC’s role and its expertise in evaluating and advising on energy-
efficient financing and related risks have also enabled the CIB and the
Bank of Beijing— both IFC clients, as well as other non-client banks, to pro-
vide green credit financing to companies more cheaply and to extend
financing to borrowers who would otherwise have been unable to obtain
it.284  In the case of CIB, the CHUEE Program led the bank to develop its
own guidelines and processes for energy-efficient lending.285
Another common green credit model for a number of top-tier commer-
cial banks involves commercial on-lending, where Chinese banks are inter-
mediary lenders for funds borrowed from foreign banks, either directly or
through the Ministry of Finance.  In these structures, the Chinese bank
commits to reinvest the funds for particular green purposes, such as energy
conservation or emissions reduction.  But the bank’s own funds are not at
risk, and the foreign lender may, as in the IFC examples, offer assistance to
the bank in identifying projects that are within the approved use of loan
proceeds.286  These examples suggest that some risk-sharing structures
indeed facilitate more effective environmental credit risk assessment and
ongoing monitoring and also help Chinese commercial banks develop their
own internal capacity.
5. Transparency
More stringent mandatory disclosure requirements and higher stake-
holder expectations regarding voluntary reporting are other factors that are
likely to create stronger incentives for banks to improve corporate govern-
ance, risk management, and environmental credit risk management prac-
281. Id. at 52– 55.
282. Interview, senior operations & CHUEE program officer, IFC, supra note 261.
283. For example, Fujian Sanxinlong Co. Ltd., a manhole-cover manufacturer,
received funding from Industrial Bank through the CHUEE program for upgrades that
generated energy savings and emissions reductions.  IFC, supra note 125, at 54.
284. In these transactions, the IFC undertook the environmental and social risk anal-
ysis.  Interview, senior operations & CHUEE program officer, IFC, supra note 261.
285. IFC, supra note 125, at 54.
286. See, e.g., CHINA CITIC BANK, supra note 249, at 91 (2015) (reporting that the
balance of its “green intermediary credit business” was 33.47 million euros in 2014).
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tices.287  As indicated in Appendix B, key indicators of bank transparency
include (i) the extent to which green finance is discussed in the annual
report, which is subject to regulatory standards and enforcement, or in a
sustainability report, which is not; and (ii) the level of reliability of the
sustainability report, which can be measured by whether the report is
based on an independent third-party standard and whether the sus-
tainability report is assured or certified by an accounting firm or other
independent third party.288  The banks included in this study must already
provide internal reports to the CBIRC on their implementation of green
credit policies in accordance with the 2014 Audit Standards and the Green
Credit Statistics System.289
The level of bank accountability for green credit implementation is
improving over time, driven in part by the sustainability reporting require-
ments of the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges, where most top-
tier banks are listed.290  Over the past decade, both the CBRC and the
China Banking Association, the trade association for financial institutions,
have also encouraged banks to improve their “social responsibility” and to
adopt regular sustainability reporting practices; and as of 2016, over half
of the banks referenced these standards in their reports.291  Eleven of the
18 banks reviewed here (61%) base their reports on the standards devel-
oped by the Global Reporting Initiative— which are widely recognized as
the international standard for sustainability reporting— in addition to Ever-
bright Bank, which uses other international standards.292  Thirteen of the
18 (72%) use third-party certification of their sustainability reports, and as
of 2016, all used international auditors, such as PWC and KPMG, for this
purpose.293  The level of space devoted to green credit programs in both
the annual and sustainability reports and the use of quantitative indicators
287. Disclosure is widely used in voluntary governance programs, including the
Equator Principles, for this reason. See EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 77, at 5.
288. These reliability measures for voluntary reporting are adopted in most standard
assessments of reporting quality and maturity, such as KPMG’s global voluntary report-
ing review. See KPMG, THE ROAD AHEAD: THE KPMG SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY REPORTING, 4, 26 (2017), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/
2017/10/kpmg-survey-of-corporate-responsibility-reporting-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc
/PNH4-B7CT].
289. See supra notes 147– 154 and accompanying text (discussing the 2014 Audit
Standards).
290. As of 2016, the eleven banks in this study that are listed on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange were required to produce mandatory sustainability reports that comply with
the stock exchange’s ESG reporting standards. See supra notes 97 & 118 and sources
cited therein.
291. The China Banking Association’s CSR standards for member banks expressly
encourage support for the government’s environmental policies, the integration of envi-
ronmental indicators in credit assessment, adoption of the Equator Principles and other
international audit standards, and annual CSR reporting certified through third-party
assurance. See CHINA BANKING ASS’N, supra note 91, art. 2(3), 17, 20, 25.
292. Other standards widely adopted by banks in this sample in addition to the G4
include ISO26000, AccountAbility 1000, the United Nations’ Global Compact, and the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange ESG Guidelines.
293. Because they are listed companies, all banks’ financial reports are externally
audited, typically by affiliates of the Big Four accounting firms.
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related to green credit also appear to be increasing over time for most of the
banks in this sample, particularly since 2015.  These external reporting
obligations create incentives for banks to improve their own environmental
transparency and practice, as well as core corporate governance and risk
management practices.
6. International Standards & Capacity Building
This study also examined the degree of the banks’ exposure to interna-
tional banking practices, which is expected to increase banks’ capacity to
implement green credit standards and ECRM.  Banks with foreign invest-
ment or financing should also exhibit better risk management practices
and, therefore, better green credit risk monitoring.
Eight of the 18 commercial banks in this study have had direct access
to international expertise and investment with respect to green finance
implementation.294  The IFC, in particular, has played a significant role in
capacity building and direct lending to seven of these banks since the intro-
duction of China’s initial green credit reforms.295  At least 6 of the 18  com-
mercial banks in this study (33%)— including CIB, SPDB, and the Bank of
Beijing— are current or former clients of the IFC, and the IFC was a strate-
gic investor in CIB when it was first listed as a public company.296  In
addition, the IFC may serve as a guarantor for its clients’ green loans, in
which case the IFC’s own standards govern the terms of the loan and envi-
ronmental and social risk management.297  The IFC has also been instru-
mental in helping the PBOC develop its credit registration system and has
advised other Chinese state agencies in developing the infrastructure of
China’s current financial system.298
Other factors also point to the deep influence of international stan-
dards on Chinese banks’ capacity to implement green credit reforms.  Five
Chinese banks are members of the United Nations’ Environmental Pro-
gramme Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI), including one in the present sample,
Merchant’s Bank.  Two Chinese banks, CIB and the Bank of Jiangsu (not
included in this study), are Equator Principles signatories; and ICBC, one
of the market leaders in green credit lending, also applies the Equator Prin-
ciples to all of its international investments, some of which may be counted
within its green credit loan portfolio.299  Other international financial
294. This figure is based on direct references in these banks’ public reports.
295. See generally IFC, supra note 125.
296. Id. at 52.
297. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) continues to serve as a guarantor
on much of CIB’s green credit financing.  Interview with branch Chief Executive Officer,
Bank C, supra note 131.
298. IFC, supra note 125, at 6– 7, 10– 11, 40, 45.
299. See UNEP FI GUIDE, 1st ed., supra note 73, Annex II (Signatories), at 34– 35.
UNEP-FI members commit to abide by nineteen voluntary principles related to sus-
tainability risk management and transparency. Id. at Annex IB.  CIB became the first
mainland Chinese financial institution to sign onto the Equator Principles in 2008. See
EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, EP Association Members & Reporting,  http://equator-principles.
com/members-reporting/ [https://perma.cc/83E4-DXYX] (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN302.txt unknown Seq: 53  8-FEB-19 14:43
2018 Sustainable Finance & Bank Monitoring 661
institutions (IFIs) have also supported a number of China’s commercial
banks as guarantors or investors.300  For example, Huaxia Bank has
obtained funding from the World Bank and the ADB that enabled it to
extend subloans governed by terms and conditions the IFIs provided,301
and SPDB has served as an on-lender for financing from the ADB and the
French Development Agency.302  The presence of IFIs in green credit
finance reduces Chinese banks’ risk, builds their capacity to evaluate green
credit risk, and allows Chinese banks to rely on the IFIs’ expertise in envi-
ronmental due diligence.
C. Limitations
Because this study is subject to several methodological limitations, its
findings are necessarily preliminary.  First, although the documentary and
interview-based data sources here describe the procedures banks have
adopted for environmental credit risk monitoring, the degree to which
interview respondents addressed their implementation varied.  Interview-
ees may also have been hesitant to discuss weaknesses and problems with a
foreign researcher, though some of these gaps were filled through meetings
with IFC representatives, consultants, and other professionals who are
familiar with bank practice.303  Without access to details regarding transac-
tions and interactions within bank departments and between banks and
their clients, which are generally proprietary or subject to confidentiality
obligations, it is not possible to gauge the impact of bank monitoring on
the borrower or project’s environmental impact.  In addition, interviews
with bank personnel were conducted only at a subset of the banks included
in this study, so further research is necessary to substantiate these
findings.
Although banks provide more detailed information on green credit in
their sustainability reports than in their annual reports, sustainability
reporting is also subject to important limitations.304  Because sus-
tainability reporting is not subject to the same requirements that apply to
mandatory financial disclosure, banks may provide different information
in different years and according to different criteria, even when using an
The U.S. signatories are Ex-Im Bank, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, and
Wells Fargo. Id.
300. For example, in 2015, the Bank of Beijing participated in a green finance train-
ing program sponsored by the IFC and remains an IFC green finance client. BANK OF
BEIJING, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 40 (2016); interview, senior operations & CHUEE pro-
gram officer, IFC, supra note 261.
301. HUAXIA BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 32 (2016); HUAXIA BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 23
(2014).
302. See, e.g., SPDB, 2015 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 79 (2016)
(describing examples of such transactions).
303. Nearly all interviews conducted in this study involved two representatives of the
same institution; this can be expected to reduce incentives to mislead but may also have
reduced interviewees’ candor.
304. The lack of comparability, reliability, consistency, and conformity to financial
materiality standards are common weaknesses of voluntary sustainability reporting
globally. See TCFD, supra note 221, at 8– 9, 13.
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independent reporting standard, as all of the surveyed reports do.  What
content is reported remains entirely at the bank’s discretion, reducing com-
parability.  For this reason, data is unavailable with respect to some mea-
sures, most notably on black credit volume— a number of banks that
reported on black credit loan volume prior to 2015 omitted this informa-
tion in their 2016 reports.  Although a growing number of banks indicate
that they define green credit loans in accordance with the 2012 Green
Credit Guidelines, not all confirm this, making meaningful comparisons
across reporting banks difficult.  As prior studies have observed, another
consequence of bank discretion is that “banks avoid reporting information
[that] may be harmful to the reputation of their brand, such as loans to
polluting companies who have caused significant damage to the local envi-
ronment.”305  My analysis of the reports relied on here confirms that banks
do not include in their sustainability reports negative information or
efforts to respond to risks that may be associated with green credit
finance.306
IV. Lessons & Implications
This preliminary analysis reveals a mixed picture.  On the one hand, it
shows that current bank practice has not resolved many of the gaps in
green credit implementation identified in prior studies, even for Chinese
banks who are green finance leaders.307  For most banks, green credit
implementation appears weighted toward policies that expand access to
credit for certain sectors over efforts to integrate environmental credit risk
assessment into how interest rates are set and into post-loan management
across the corporate loan portfolio.  At the same time, this study offers
evidence that most of the largest banks have established mechanisms for
identifying and monitoring corporate borrowers’ environmental credit risk.
The indicators of financial institutions’ capacity to undertake monitoring
that emerge in this study appear to reflect top-down regulatory pressure on
banks to expand debt financing to green sectors, to monitor environmental
credit risk for certain “black” sectors, and to improve internal reporting of
green credit compliance and outcomes to the CBIRC.
This analysis also shows that while some of the challenges confronting
green credit implementation in China derive from the Chinese institutional
context and its state-led model, others do not.  Here, I draw on Part III’s
analysis to identify these barriers and to distinguish those that are relevant
305. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 13, supra note 23, at 33. R
306. Id. at 59– 60.
307. For example, id. summarizes the limits of green credit implementation as of
2013 to include: (i) organization & governance: “lack of board leadership on E&S
issues;” “lack of dedicated resources for E&S for all but the leading banks;” (ii) policy,
system, and capacity building: “policies on credit screening based on E&S risks tend to
be driven by national policies;” “small number of green products and services;” “lack of
capacity, training and knowledge in most banks on E&S issues;” (iii) process manage-
ment: “lack of independence and/or robustness of due diligence process;” (iv) internal
controls and information disclosure: “disclosure of green finance limited to positive mar-
keting of banks’ activities.”
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across jurisdictions, discussed in Section A, from those that are unique to
the Chinese institutional context, discussed in Section B.  As I argue below,
these observations have important normative implications for our under-
standing of the role of creditors in corporate governance within different
institutional settings, as well as for the development of future sustainable
finance reforms in other markets around the world.
A. Shared Challenges
The most pressing technical and practical challenges that China is fac-
ing in implementing green credit and promoting lender monitoring reflect
the fact that green or sustainable finance is relatively new and so banks
must quickly build capacity to implement these programs.  First among
these are definitional issues.  As the OECD has noted, the relatively recent
evolution of green finance innovations means that what constitutes a green
investment tends to be defined differently by different companies, in differ-
ent sectors, and for different purposes.308  In China, the CBRC’s 2012
Guidelines, technical guidance on the Green Credit Statistical System, and
regulatory audits go some way in standardizing how the largest Chinese
banks define green credit and measure environmental benefits.  However,
the broad green credit measures currently in use leave open the prospect of
greenwashing or a race to the bottom where green loans count toward a
bank’s own internal loan volume target or toward meeting the regulator’s
policy goals but do not require any environmental or social risk
assessment.
Costs and capacity constraints are another area where Chinese and
international banks face similar challenges.309  First is the cost of getting
information.  In an era of evolving regulatory and market standards for
defining and monitoring green finance products, developing and imple-
menting such standards in-house or obtaining third-party assistance is
costly.  Both Chinese banks and Western financial institutions must build
expertise in assessing environmental issues across the organization to
implement green finance programs,310 either by hiring environmental
experts to evaluate environmental credit risk internally, or by outsourcing
this responsibility to external consultants.  In addition, the longer-term
costs of monitoring borrowers post-disbursement mean that banks are
more likely to engage in front-end due diligence rather than ongoing over-
sight.  Finally, the fact that green finance is so new means that the histori-
cal data that lenders need to confidently assess environmental and social
risk is often unavailable.311
308. See generally Georg Inderst et al., Defining and Measuring Green Investments:
Implications for Institutional Investors’ Asset Allocations (OECD Working Papers on
Finance, Insurance, and Private Pensions, No. 24, 2012) (surveying the range of
definitions).
309. These challenges have already been identified in the literature on creditors’ role
in corporate governance. See supra notes 78– 81 and accompanying text. R
310. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERs, supra note 13, at 59 (reviewing gaps in Chinese
practice).
311. Interview with branch Chief Executive Officer, Bank C, supra note 131.
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Finally, any effort to develop financial systems that promote, rather
than impede, environmental conservation and other important develop-
ment goals will require new forms of regulatory cooperation and informa-
tion sharing across traditional administrative silos.  The UNEP-FI and the
G20’s Financial Stability Board are already working with governments and
financial institutions worldwide to develop these types of policy initia-
tives.312  In addition, national and subnational dynamics will directly
affect implementation.  For example, in China, regulatory cooperation
between environmental agencies and securities and financial regulators,
and between the MEE (and formerly, the MEP) at the central level and local
EPBs, has not always been smooth.  However, the 2016 Green Finance
Guiding Opinions signal new efforts to improve cross-agency information
exchange and to overcome the technical barriers as well as deeper collabo-
ration among different regulatory arenas that could provide a starting
point for other governments to consider.313
B. Unique Challenges
The transition from traditional finance to green finance in all jurisdic-
tions necessarily raises novel questions about the degree to which financial
markets can and should address public policy goals, but the implementa-
tion of China’s green finance reforms is particularly complicated by politi-
cal questions that are a function of its unique institutional context.  The
state’s control of both the banking sector and the heavy industry sectors
most responsible for environmental degradation means that reducing debt
financing for high-polluting firms or sectors may be possible only with the
blessing of the relevant authorities and is not a decision that will be based
entirely on credit risk assessments, whether they include environmental
and social metrics or not.  The tensions inherent in China’s current devel-
opment strategy have also led regulators at times to send mixed signals to
banks about their approach to environmental credit risk.  For example, in
2015, the CBRC, which had already encouraged banks to curtail financing
to high-polluting sectors, cautioned them against “withdrawing, stopping
or withholding loans in a one-size-fits-all manner” and urged them instead
to consider “local economic and financial performance” and to “strengthen
credit support” for companies in “overcapacity” sectors, such as iron, steel,
and cement.314  Also, by defining green finance largely on a sectoral basis,
state policy could promote an inflation of green financial products, stimu-
312. The 2015 report of the UNEP Inquiry into the Design of a Sustainable Financial
System identifies over 40 different measures and separate policy paths for “banking,
bond and equity markets, institutional investors and insurance” to strengthen the role of
finance in promoting sustainable development. See UNEP-FI ANNUAL OVERVIEW 26
(2015).
313. The 2016 Guiding Opinions stress the need to integrate the EPB’s data on envi-
ronmental compliance violations with the data on credit risk, perhaps to include the
PBOC’s national credit database, with a goal of creating a common platform for integrat-
ing these basic risk indicators into the financial system. See GREEN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
GUIDING OPINIONS, supra note 166, at para. 4.
314. CBRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 9, at 75. R
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late a new bubble in renewable energy and other green sectors, and dilute
the market’s ability to differentiate among investments based on their real
contribution to sustainability.
The core policy question, then, is how strongly China’s leadership is
committed to market-based reform models.  China’s green finance policies
already endorse a hybrid model where state policy priorities drive bank
practice, but where the state must rely on banks’ own credit risk assess-
ments, monitoring practices, and market-based pricing to allocate capital.
Because China’s approach is state-driven, its success depends more heavily
on the ability of state agencies at all levels to support green finance initia-
tives and market-based reforms.  Bank responsiveness to market incentives
will also depend on banks’ ability to address NPL overhangs, maintain
profitability, and improve basic corporate governance and risk manage-
ment practices.  Getting these fundamentals right first is particularly
important before smaller banks and branches can implement more com-
plex ECRM processes.
C. Unique Tools
One of the pitfalls of contemporary comparative scholarship on China
has been the tendency for outside observers to focus on the limits of the
Chinese approach and discount elements of the Chinese institutional con-
text that may help it move beyond apparent obstacles to economic or legal
reform.  This perspective can also obscure innovations that might benefit
observers in other jurisdictions.  The risks of discounting the Chinese
experience are both higher and more problematic in an area like sustaina-
ble finance, which has clear global implications and raises questions of
first impression in nearly all economies.
A strength of China’s green finance model is that the central govern-
ment tasks Chinese banks with serving the real economy and assesses
their performance against both market measures and public policy out-
comes.315  Although party-state control may impede some aspects of mar-
ket-based green credit reform, political personnel controls and the
regulatory oversight that China’s central leadership and the CBIRC wield
over China’s top financial institutions create strong policy levers to pro-
mote green credit that are absent in most other countries.  In contrast to
the United States, for example, where financial regulation does not impose
any obligation on financial institutions to incorporate environmental and
social indicators into their credit risk assessments, the CBIRC is committed
to evaluating banks on their green credit implementation under the 2014
Green Credit Audit Standards.316
315. See STENT, supra note 92, at xi– xii, 1, 24, 212 (describing Chinese banks as a
hybrid model, merging modern Western banking practice and traditional Chinese con-
cepts of banks’ public role).
316. See CBRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 9, at 59.  As early as 2012, CBRC officials R
had already signaled their intent to develop this rating system, keyed to banks’ imple-
mentation of the 2012 Guidelines, as a tool to ultimately determine a banks’ “institu-
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN302.txt unknown Seq: 58  8-FEB-19 14:43
666 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 51
Of course, there is no guarantee that top-down pressure on financial
institutions will resolve the transparency challenges that lie at the heart of
green credit implementation.  In the absence of high-quality information
from either local EPBs or clients to the banks themselves, banks are likely
to do the best with what they have, to charge higher interest rates to
projects in high-risk sectors, and to hedge or shift risk when necessary.
However, the concerted policy priority on green finance at the present time
may motivate the CBIRC, the MEE, and other key agencies in the green
finance space to tackle some of these barriers to bank monitoring.
Chinese banks are also embedded in the global institutional context of
modern capital markets and political and social structures, and as dis-
cussed above, Chinese green credit implementation has drawn heavily on
international guidance, technical assistance, and investment support.
Bank regulators and management are also well aware that international and
local NGOs are monitoring how well the banks address the potential
impacts of the projects and clients they fund both at home and abroad.317
The complementary pressures of deepening international capital market
integration and top-down regulatory oversight may drive Chinese financial
institutions to address some of the technical barriers to green credit
reform.
D. Implications for Sustainable Finance Reform
Despite its unique institutional context, there are good reasons to con-
sider what insights for sustainable finance initiatives elsewhere can be
drawn from the Chinese green finance test case.  First, consider the scale
and scope of China’s efforts.  By some estimates, China will need to raise
over $300 billion by 2020 in order to make headway in addressing its vast
environmental challenges and transitioning to a low-carbon economy.318
This reality creates sustained demand for multiple policy experiments that
can all be observed in a relatively short timespan and within a single coun-
try.  And since China’s green finance agenda has now been building for
more than a decade, it is now possible to trace China’s policy progression
and begin to see what works and what doesn’t.  Moreover, the Chinese
experiment is, in some respects, more instructive for developing countries,
because China began introducing green finance policies, banking sector
reforms, and more environmentally conscious development strategies at
roughly at the same time in the 2000s, and all from a very low base.  The
efforts of Western governments, who have spent decades exporting best
practices to China and other countries with vastly different economic and
tional access” and the promotion opportunities of its executives. See China Sustainable
Finance Letter, No. 15, Aug. 7, 2012 (quoting a senior CBRC official).
317. Interview with branch Chief Executive Officer, Bank C, supra note 131; interview
with senior official, CBRC, supra note 150.
318. See Umesh Desai, China’s First Green Bond to Spur Interest for Future Deals,
REUTERS (July 20, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/china-greenbond/chinas-first-
green-bond-to-spur-interest-for-future-deals-idUSL4N0ZW4XN20150720 [https://
perma.cc/5QSQ-3N6W] (quoting China’s green financial system taskforce).
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political conditions, also suggest that different institutional starting points
are not an impassable bar to innovation sharing in the other direction,
though institutional differences may affect which lessons will bear fruit.
What then can we learn from the test case of China’s green credit
reforms?  Certainly, the Chinese case shows that public policy matters.
Indeed, international organizations have recognized that sustainable
finance requires policy coherence across related areas of regulation and
have highlighted China’s leadership in this regard.319  For example,
tougher environmental enforcement makes environmental risk more mate-
rial to lenders.  In addition, supportive policies to promote access to infor-
mation about corporate environmental impacts may be necessary to level
the playing field for banks and corporate borrowers alike in competitive
markets where lenders may be unwilling to undertake environmental due
diligence.  Of course, financial institutions elsewhere may respond more
slowly to policy leadership than banks in the Chinese system, but even in
the United States, regulatory oversight is more rigorous for banks than non-
financial sectors because of their systemic importance and public welfare
impacts.320  As a result, bank regulators may have more power to facilitate
ECRM practices even in Western markets.  Finally, if the example of Chi-
nese banks is any indication, financial institutions will need time to
develop ECRM systems and more sophisticated approaches to identifying,
pricing, or managing environmental risk, all of which may proceed more
quickly with some degree of policy support.
A more striking conclusion from the Chinese experience to date is that
while regulatory guidance can promote sustainable finance, market condi-
tions and incentives matter most if green finance reforms are to succeed.
Strong policy support in the past few years has led to annual increases in
the level of green credit issued by Chinese banks, but these gains may
already have leveled off at around 10% of all corporate lending.321  Public
policy can most easily move banks to expand financing to green sectors.
But even without policy leadership, banks might promote green credit pro-
grams to gain market access or reputational benefits if market conditions
are so aligned.322  This first dimension of green credit is, therefore, the
easiest to implement, and outside of China, green lending also seems to be
319. See UNEP INQUIRY, supra note 4, at 13. R
320. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, Bank Governance and Systemic Stability: The “Golden
Share” Approach, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1029, 1040– 41 (2017) (identifying bank governance as
a “matter of public interest”); Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Special,” Vestigial,
or Visionary? What Bank Regulation Tells Us About the Corporation . . . And Vice Versa, 39
SEATTLE L. REV. 453 (2016) (reviewing the historical and contemporary antecedents of
banks’ public powers and functions).
321. See tbl. 1 (showing aggregate green credit volume as a percentage of total corpo-
rate lending).
322. For example, major U.S. banks seem to be seeking a first mover advantage
through green finance in the first sense. See, e.g., CITI, 2017 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSI-
BILITY REPORT 10 (highlighting the use of green finance “league tables” to showcase deal
volume relative to peer institutions).
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taking root most quickly in this limited sense.323  But truly “greening” the
financial system will require more.
Indeed, China’s green credit experiment confirms that the second
dimension of green lending— undertaking environmental risk monitoring—
is harder.324  For smaller banks, weaker borrowers, and short-term lend-
ing, traditional credit risk analysis is more likely to matter to lenders than
environmental risk factors.325  Chinese banks are willing to invest in
assessing borrowers’ environmental credit risk only when that risk is high
enough to justify the monitoring cost: when the project’s environmental
risk could impair debt repayment.  Reported green credit loan volumes do
not capture the extent of ECRM practice, and this deeper dimension of
green lending is currently reported, if at all, in bank sustainability reports.
Still, green finance ultimately depends on banks and other financial insti-
tutions being able to distinguish not only “black” and “green” but “shades
of green” so they can ultimately incorporate, price, and rate environmental
credit risk for all investments and ultimately for more complex financial
instruments across public debt and equity markets as well.  Many leading
Western banks have only recently developed their own ECRM policies,326
so it may be some time before standard approaches to these challenges
emerge.
A final lesson, particularly for developing economies, is that China’s
green finance innovations have not happened in isolation.  Instead, they
have been built on over a decade of capacity-building and direct investment
support from international financial institutions and on the foundation of
international standards for bank operations and oversight.  In this respect,
banking reform has parallels to the role of foreign direct investment in
China’s broader economic reforms.327  For other developing economies
whose banks have not yet adopted robust risk management systems, the
Chinese model suggests that both state guidance and external support are
critical ingredients of the reform process.
Conclusion
Governments worldwide are now considering how best to promote
green finance to facilitate growth in a way that not only enhances economic
323. See, e.g., BANK OF AMERICA, 2017 SUSTAINABILITY REPORT, at 2 (setting a goal to
reach $125 billion in green finance by 2025); CITI, supra note 322, at 8 (defining green
finance goals in terms green sectors).
324. Prior studies of European banks from the mid-2000s also found less effort to
price environmental and social risk. See generally Olaf Weber et al., Empirical Analysis of
the Integration of Environmental Risks into the Credit Risk Management Process of European
Banks, 17 BUS. STRAT. & ENV’T. 149, 154– 56 (2008).
325. Interview with bank managers, Bank A, in Shanghai (July 2017).
326. See, e.g., BANK OF AMERICA, supra note 323, at 3 (reporting publication of its
policy only in 2016).
327. For an account of that history, see generally YASHENG HUANG, SELLING CHINA:
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DURING THE REFORM ERA (2003).
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sustainability but also advances global development goals.328  Given the
size and scale of China’s capital markets, China’s green finance reforms are
significant not only for the Chinese economy but for their potential influ-
ence on how global capital markets approach sustainable finance and
investment and respond to global environmental crisis.
This study has examined China’s latest green credit reforms as a test
case of banks’ ability to monitor and price corporate borrowers’ environ-
mental and social risk.  It has shown that the scale of green credit issued by
China’s largest banks has increased exponentially in recent years, and that
green finance policies adopted by the CBIRC and other regulators are moti-
vating top-tier financial institutions to implement environmental and social
credit risk monitoring systems.  These developments confirm the impor-
tance of banks’ monitoring role as green finance gatekeepers, particularly
in markets like China’s where debt financing predominates.  However,
China’s experience also shows that even when policy incentives and state
leadership are strong and when the banks at issue are among the largest
financial institutions in the world, real costs and capacity constraints can
impede banks’ ability to measure and monitor environmental risk.
Given the preliminary nature of this study and the novelty of green
finance globally, many fundamental questions remain.  At a practical level,
future research could usefully examine the contractual, structural, and
financial tools banks use to manage risk; the relative weight given to envi-
ronmental, social, and financial sources of credit risk for green credit loans
in both green and “non-green” sectors; and how much the strength of regu-
latory enforcement in different jurisdictions affects banks’ incentives to
monitor environmental risk.  As more banks expand green asset securitiza-
tion, the impact of financial intermediation on monitoring incentives will
also demand further exploration.329  Future research is also needed to test
the impact of bank monitoring on corporate borrowers’ own environmental
and social risk management practices.
Taken as a whole, the research presented here shows that the rosy pic-
ture of green credit presented in banks’ public disclosures obscures some
of the real obstacles to sustainable finance and investment and to the moni-
toring role of Chinese banks at the present time.  Some of these challenges
are deeply rooted in the Chinese institutional structure, but most are com-
mon challenges in other jurisdictions as well.  Some are part of the growing
pains that attend any new large-scale change in a dynamic, competitive,
and globally integrated environment.  No doubt, some of these innovations
will not succeed.  But the United States’ own experience of initiating some-
times misguided and imperfect reforms shows that even what is done
328. See UNEP, G20 FINANCIAL LEADERS COMMIT TO EXPLORING GREEN FINANCE OPTIONS
(2016), https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/unep/blog/g20-financial-leaders-commit-explor
ing-green-finance-options [https://perma.cc/J2VG-MRNG].
329. The IFC has already begun working with Chinese banks on green asset securi-
tization. See AGRICULTURAL BANK OF CHINA, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 72
(2016).
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imperfectly can have a huge and often positive effect.330  Given their visibil-
ity, scale, and ambition, the same may be true for green credit reforms in
China as well.
330. The halting progress yet global influence of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission’s 2010 guidance on climate-related risk disclosure is but one example.
Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Exchange Act
Release Nos. 33– 9106, 34– 61469, FR– 82 (Feb. 8, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/rules/
interp/2010/33-9106.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MEU-WLP6].
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APPENDIX A: Banks Included in the Analysis331
Bank Type Listing 
Agricultural Bank of China 
ѝഭߌъ䬦㹼 
state-owned commercial 
bank (SOCB) 
HKEx*; 
SSE** 
Agriculture Development Bank 
of China 
ѝഭߌъਁኅ䬦㹼 
policy bank N/A 
Bank of Beijing 
ेӜ䬦㹼 
municipal commercial 
bank SSE 
Bank of China 
ѝഭ䬦㹼 SOCB HKEx; SSE 
Bank of Communications 
ѝഭӔ䙊䬦㹼 SOCB HKEx; SSE 
China Bohai Bank 
⑔⎧䬦㹼 joint-stock commercial N/A 
China CITIC Bank 
ѝؑ䬦㹼 joint-stock commercial 
HKEx; SSE; 
NYSE 
China Construction Bank 
ѝഭᔪ䇮䬦㹼 SOCB HKEx; SSE 
China Development Bank 
ഭᇦᔰਁ䬦㹼 policy bank N/A 
China Everbright Bank 
ѝഭݹབྷ䬦㹼 joint-stock commercial HKEx; SSE 
China Industrial Bank 
ޤъ䬦㹼 joint-stock commercial SSE 
China Merchants Bank 
ᤋ୶䬦㹼 joint-stock commercial HKEx; SSE 
China Minsheng Bank 
ѝഭ≁⭏䬦㹼 joint-stock commercial HKEx; SSE 
China Zheshang Bank 
⎉୶䬦㹼 joint-stock commercial HKEx 
Export-Import Bank of China 
ഭᇦᔰਁ䬦㹼 policy bank N/A 
Hengfeng Bank 
ᚂѠ䬦㹼 joint-stock commercial Not yet listed 
Huaxia Bank 
ॾ༿䬦㹼 joint-stock commercial SSE 
331. Source: CBRC, Financial Institutions in the Domestic Banking Sector, http://
www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/jrjg/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZP4D-M75C] (last visited
Apr. 3, 2017).
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Bank Type Listing 
Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China 
ѝഭᐕ୶䬦㹼 
SOCB HKEx; SSE 
Ping An Bank 
ᒣᆹ䬦㹼 joint-stock commercial SZSE*** 
Postal Savings Bank of China 
ѝഭ䛞᭯ۘ㫴䬦㹼 postal savings bank HKEx 
Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank 
к⎧⎖ьਁኅ䬦㹼 
joint-stock commercial SSE 
*Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
** Shanghai Stock Exchange 
*** Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
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APPENDIX B: Content Analysis
Except as noted, the following indicators were coded as binary variables
(1=present, 0=absent), regardless of whether they appeared in the bank’s
annual report or sustainability report. All results are based on information
self-disclosed by the banks. The three policy banks are excluded from this
analysis.
  2014 
% reporting 
(n=18) 
2015 
% reporting 
(n=18) 
2016 
% reporting 
(n=18) 
Level of Green 
Credit 
Green credit loan 
balance 
16 (89%) 16 (89%) 16 (89%) 
 Black credit loan 
balance  
12 (67%) 10 (56%) 9 (50%) 
 Withdraws or rejects 
“black credit” finance 
13 (72%) 6 (33%) 9 (50%) 
Priority of Green 
Credit 
    
E/S* integration in 
corporate 
governance 
Board or committee 
responsibility for E/S 
oversight  
5 (28%) 4 (22%) 4 (22%) 
Mitigates own E/S 
risk 
Reports bank 
mitigation efforts or 
outcomes 
14 (78%) 16 (89%) 16 (89%) 
Stakeholder 
orientation 
Discusses stakeholder 
engagement 
9 (50%) 8 (44%) 13 (72%) 
 Reports social 
contribution per share 
8 (44%) 10 (56%) 9 (50%) 
Bank E/S 
transparency 
Mentions green finance 
in annual report 
10 (56%) 12 (67%) 12 (67%) 
ECRM 
Implementation 
    
 Mentions green credit 
policies in annual or 
sustainability report 
12 (67%) 15 (83%) 17 (94%) 
 E/S included in credit 
risk assessment  
7 (39%) 7 (39%) 11 (61%) 
 Conducts E/S 
monitoring (post-
issuance) 
3 (17%) 8 (44%) 8 (44%) 
Transparency     
 Mentions green finance 
in annual report 
10 (56%) 12 (67%) 12 (67%) 
 Mentions green credit 
policies in annual or 
sustainability or report 
12 (67%) 15 (83%) 17 (94%) 
 Sustainability reporting 
based on third-party 
standard 
13 (72%) 13 (72%) 13 (72%) 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN302.txt unknown Seq: 66  8-FEB-19 14:43
674 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 51
  2014 
% reporting 
(n=18) 
2015 
% reporting 
(n=18) 
2016 
% reporting 
(n=18) 
 Third-party 
certification of 
sustainability report 
8 (44%) 12 (67%) 13 (72%) 
International 
Integration 
    
 Signatory or utilizes 
Equator Principles.  
1 (6%) 1 (6%) 
 
2 (12%) 
 Sustainability reporting 
based on international 
third-party standard 
(i.e. GRI4) 
8 (44%) 12 (67%) 13 (72%) 
 Third-party 
certification of 
sustainability report 
8 (44%) 12 (67%) 13 (72%) 
 Of those, international 
auditor certified (i.e. 
KPMG, PWC) 
10 (56%) 12 (100%) 13 (100%) 
*”E/S” refers to environmental or social factors or performance indicators. 
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APPENDIX D: 2014 Green Credit Audit Standards Recommended
Content of Environmental and Social Risk Management Contract
(Selected)332
1. Borrower Representations & Warrantiess
1.1 Representation and Warranty that borrower’s internal records
regarding environmental and social risk management are compli-
ant with applicable regulations
1.2 Representation and warranty that borrower has not been sub-
ject to significant litigation regarding environmental or social
risks
2. Restrictive Covenants Regarding Lender Supervision & Borrower
Environmental & Social Risk Management
2.1 Covenant to comply with all regulations (related to environ-
mental and social risk)
2.2 Covenant to establish an internal risk management system for
environmental and social risk
2.3 Covenant to implement emergency procedures for responding
to accidents that have environmental impact
2.4 Covenant to establish a dedicated department or personnel
with responsibility for environmental and social risk management
2.5 Covenant to comply with lender or qualified third-party
requests to conduct environmental or social risk assessment
[2.6– 2.8 omitted]
3. Borrower Reporting Requirements
3.1 Notice confirming receipt of required permits and approvals
from environmental and labor authorities.
3.2 Notice of inspection or assessment of borrower’s environmen-
tal and social practices by regulatory authorities.
[3.3– 3.5 omitted]
3.6 Notice of any significant claim by the community against the
lender.
[3.7– 3.8 omitted]
4. Breach Defined
4.1 Breach of environmental and social risk management
covenants
4.2 Borrower subject to penalty from relevant government agen-
cies for poor management of environmental and social risks.
4.3 Borrower criticized by the public or the media for poor man-
agement of environmental and social risk.
[Other breaches defined by contract]
5. Remedies for Breach
5.1 Revocation of loan commitment
5.2 Temporary suspension of loan disbursement
5.3 Acceleration of debt repayment
332. AUDIT STANDARDS, supra note 149, at app. V.  These clauses are selections from
the list of twenty-seven recommended provisions.
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APPENDIX E: Interview Sources
No. Date Title Institution Informant 
Type 
City 
1 July 
2016 
Chief Executive 
Officer 
Bank C commercial 
bank branch 
Hong 
Kong 
2 Apr 
2017 
staff assistant China Bank Regulatory 
Commission 
central 
government 
Beijing 
3 May 
2017 
environmental 
specialist 
World Bank (Beijing) international 
financial 
institution 
Beijing 
4 May 
2017 
green finance 
director 
Bank B commercial 
bank branch 
Shanghai 
5–6 July 
2017 
green bond 
assurance 
consultants; 
sustainable 
finance 
consultants 
Syntao Green Finance sustainable 
finance 
consultancy 
Beijing 
7 July 
2017 
senior CBRC 
official 
China Bank Regulatory 
Commission 
central 
government 
Beijing 
8 July 
2017 
senior NDRC 
official 
National Development & 
Reform Commission 
central 
government 
Beijing 
9 July 
2017 
IFC senior 
operations & 
CHUEE 
program officer 
International Finance 
Corporation (Beijing) 
international 
financial 
institution 
Beijing 
10 July 
2017 
bank manager  Bank C commercial 
bank 
headquarters 
Beijing 
11 July 
2017 
IFC green 
finance 
consultant 
International Finance 
Corporation - Green Credit 
& Bank Risk Management 
(Beijing) 
international 
financial 
institution 
Beijing 
12-13 July 
2017 
bank managers Bank A commercial 
bank branch 
Shanghai 
14 July 
2017 
lawyer, banking 
practice 
international law firm lawyer Shanghai 
15 July 
2017 
division 
manager  
Bank B commercial 
bank branch 
Shanghai 
16 July 
2017 
staff assistant Bank B commercial 
bank branch 
Shanghai 
17 July 
2017 
lawyer, banking 
practice 
international law firm lawyer Hong 
Kong 
18 July 
2017 
lawyer, banking 
practice 
international law firm lawyer Beijing 
19 July 
2017 
accountant & 
senior manager 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Business Consulting 
(Shanghai) Co. Ltd., 
Sustainability & Climate 
Change  
CSR & green 
finance 
assurance 
Shanghai 
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No. Date Title Institution Informant 
Type 
City 
20 July 
2017 
accountant & 
manager 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Business Consulting 
(Shanghai) Co. Ltd., 
Sustainability & Climate 
Change 
CSR & green 
finance 
assurance 
Shanghai 
21 July 
2017 
bank manager Bank D commercial 
bank 
(branch) 
Shanghai 
22 July 
2017 
financial analyst investment firm domestic 
financial 
institution 
(other) 
Shanghai 
23 July 
2017 
bank manager HSBC international 
bank 
(branch) 
Hong 
Kong 
24-25 July 
2018 
green finance 
committee 
members 
China Banking Association trade 
association 
Beijing 
